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ABSTRACT 
A system of systems design is the development of multiple systems that 
individually provide various functions that collectively support a holistic functional 
capability. With the evolution of today’s increased demand for heterogeneous systems 
that integrate to form complex system of systems, integration and interoperability are 
critical to cost, schedule, and performance during the lifecycle of a product. Successful 
integration and interoperability must be achieved for future system of systems. 
Enterprises must explore and discover the current and future techniques of building both 
human and technical systems that requires a deep knowledge and understanding of 
integration and interoperability. In support of this goal, this thesis, through research and 
analysis, develops a descriptive and prescriptive approach to assist management in 
achieving integration and interoperability. This thesis discovers the key attributes that 
result in an integrated and interoperable system and determines new procedures and 
techniques that can be recommended to achieve the system engineering required to 
support interoperability and ensure integration of system of systems. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
With the evolution of today’s increasing demand for heterogeneous systems that 
integrate to form complex system of systems, integration and interoperability are critical 
to cost, schedule and performance during the lifecycle of a product. The development of 
commercial and military capabilities that depend on a system of systems design using 
Command and Control, Computer, Communication, and Intelligence Systems (C4I) or 
net-centric based design needs to be both integrated and interoperable to ensure effective 
capabilities are fielded.  
Some within the acquisition community believe the statutory laws, regulatory 
laws, and various Department of Defense instructions related to program acquisition are 
all that is required for developing integrated and interoperable solutions. This thesis 
examines a sample of the eighty eight laws and instructions found that reference either 
integration or interoperability. Given the lack of scope and definition used in these 
documents, it is unlikely they will ensure system of systems is integrated and 
interoperable. 
The goal of this thesis, through research, analysis, and synthesis was to review 
successful and unsuccessful programs and build a foundation to understand system 
design characteristics. A modeling approach was used to discover key attributes that 
resulted in an integrated and interoperable system and provide identification of 
procedures and techniques that can be recommended to program managers to achieve the 
system engineering required to support interoperability and ensure integration of system 
of systems. The procedures and techniques recommended for any future integration and 
interoperability are in the areas of 1) capability architecting, 2) modeling and simulation, 
and 3) operational assessment during development testing. 
The research, investigation, and analysis of system integration and 
interoperability conducted as part of this thesis establishes a pro-active approach to 
successful integration and interoperability system designs and a framework that could be 
used to evaluate, normalize and prescribe corrections within a lifecycle of a program.   
 xviii
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
The development and fielding of system of systems continues to result in non-
integrated and non-interoperable systems that deliver less than expected capabilities. For 
system of systems programs, “integration and interoperability (I2)” is critical to 
success. The meaning of these words will guide the discussion of this thesis (Agnes, 
2006). 
integrate: to make whole or complete by adding or bringing together parts; unify.  
interoperability: the ability of a system or component to function effectively 
with other systems or components. 
Systems integration is not simply an engineering or operations task, it 
encompasses technical, strategic and organizational capabilities (Hobday, Davies, & 
Prencipe, 2005). The systems integration process provides assurance to the customer that 
all system elements will function as a whole. Systems integration extends to the holistic 
notion that involves all of the organizational components of an enterprise during the 
entire cycle of the acquisition process. Interoperability solutions for an acquisition require 
comprehensive integration strategies that go beyond simple connections. Largely, 
successful integration depends on maintaining a system perspective (Rifley, 2008).  
The introduction of net-centric warfare, an architectural foundation that integrates 
all Department of Defense (DoD) information systems, requires interoperability across an 
increasing number of C4I systems to work together harmoniously to deliver a warfighting 
capability. The integration and interoperability of an infrastructure is paramount, because 
the advantage of net-centric warfare is sharing information through people, processes, 
and technology. This thesis will determine if the current laws, DoD instructions, systems 
engineering steps within a program acquisition, and/or culture within an enterprise are 
inhibiting or improving the integration of system of systems.  
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B. PURPOSE 
This research explores the cause(s) of DoD system of systems non-integration and 
non-interoperability and the challenges that are involved. This research will identify the 
key components to “integration and interoperability (I2)” required for systems designs 
and identify potential roadblocks of fielding effective I2 systems. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The implementation of the various policies and processes regarding I2 systems 
that impact a system’s design do not always have the expected outcome. In some cases, 
the cause(s) of system of systems non-integration and non-interoperability are related to 
other attributes not defined in these policies and processes. The following questions were 
designed to understand the challenges and opportunities to identify not only an 
interoperable system (all parts work together to form a whole) but an integrated system 
(all parts interact seamlessly, in a synchronized fashion). 
1. How do the current policies and processes of successful large system of 
systems designs support I2? 
2. How effective are the existing laws and DoD instructions in ensuring 
integration and interoperability? 
3. What are the key attributes that result in an integrated and interoperable 
system? 
4. What new procedures or techniques can be recommended to determine the 
system engineering required to support interoperability and ensure 
integration of system of systems? 
D. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
System of systems being developed or currently fielded are not taking into 
account integration beyond the immediate system interface boundary, through legacy 
requirements or misuse of capability based requirements. New approaches need to be 
explored to address the challenges of the large scale, rapid pace, and simultaneous efforts 
of system of systems development (Kaplan, 2006). 
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The requirement to use standard interfaces have improved point-to-point 
interoperability but have not consistently improved the integration of multiple system of 
systems. Many advocates propose the use of “standards” for these types of interfaces. 
The interface standards are not always written clearly; thereby, allowing “interpretation” 
of these standards. The resolution of these loopholes within the interface standards have 
been slow to resolve and slower to implement.   
The warfighter is faced with the challenge of making systems with individual 
capabilities interoperate within the current system of systems environment, as new 
individual systems are fielded. The requirement for integrated and interoperable system 
of systems is essential to enable a net-centric environment.  
This analytical review seeks to look past the symptoms of systems that lack I2 and 
look at the criticality of non-integration and non-interoperability. Research into the 
current policies, processes, examples of successful I2 systems design, and examples of 
challenged I2 systems design will determine the gaps and opportunities for better I2. This 
thesis will recommend ways to identify and improve designs with concern to I2 for future 
systems. 
E. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will focus on systems within a larger system of systems environment. 
The research and analysis will be related to the cause of non-integration and non-
interoperability in current acquisitions and equipment fielding. Competitive advantage in 
business and war requires capabilities that result from the interoperability of systems and 
the integration of many processes (Kaplan, 2006).  
By exploring the differences and similarities of I2 attributes of programs, this 
thesis will produce a best practice model that can be realized to assist program managers 
in their effort to establish successful I2 within a system of systems. In this chapter and 
Chapter IV, a review of the program I2 attributes will be examined to reveal the 
successful and unsuccessful I2 of system of systems. In Chapter V, a descriptive, 
normative and prescriptive model comprising a system of systems framework is proposed 
to provide categorization of attributes to introduce a best practice approach to applying I2 
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to system of systems (Valerdi, Ross, & Rhodes, 2007). The methodology for this 
framework will be defined and applied in Chapter V. The information that will populate 
the models will be extracted from the research acquired in Chapters III and IV. In 
addition, heuristics by the authors are utilized which are in two forms: descriptive and 
prescriptive. Descriptive, which describes a situation but does not give direction on what 
to do, and prescriptive, which indicates what might be accomplished in a given situation 
(Maier & Rechtin, 2000). 
This paper will present and I2 framework for system of systems and recommend 
approaches to augment capabilities under evolving circumstances. 
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II. CROSSWALK OF C4I I2 DOCUMENTED “RULES” 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The federal government has highlighted the importance of integration and 
interoperability among physical systems and organizations. This is evident by the 
government requiring acquisition programs to follow specific mandates in two types of 
laws: statutory law and regulations and administrative law. Simply stated, Statutory Law 
consists of acts of legislatures and Regulatory Law consists of policies and procedures 
needed to administer the statutory laws passed by Congress and signed by the President 
(Knight, 2006). From these laws, the DoD has developed policy documents and 
specifications in the form of Directives and Regulations, respectively.   
This chapter provides a crosswalk of these various documents to better appreciate 
and understand how the documents have helped the integration and interoperability (I2) 
required for system designs.  
B. BEHIND THE LAWS 
In the early 1980s, military procurement had a series of public acquisition 
failures. Some of the more known problems were the $435 hammer as part of the 34C 
Trainer kits, the $640 toilet-seat cover for the P-3 aircraft, the $659 ashtrays for the E-2C 
aircraft, and the much-publicized $3,046 coffee maker for the C-5 airplane. Most of these 
are true, but further investigation of these costs changes the story (National Review, 
1985). 
The $640 toilet-seat cover was actually the cost of the entire waste system 
onboard the P-3. Delta and TWA buy similar coffee makers for $3,107 each, which 
makes the C-5 coffee maker look like a bargain (National Review, 1985). 
These publicized procurements, which were part of various acquisition programs 
by the DoD, looked to be unethical and or wasteful procurements by Congress and others. 
Congress conducted numerous hearings with DoD senior leaders and Program Managers 
which resulted in hundreds of thousands of requests for information. Over the next 
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several years, Congress passed a series of laws, procedures, reviews, and reports that 
acquisition programs were required to follow and complete. As a result of this 
Congressional action, a new layer of bureaucracy within the acquisition timeline was 
established (National Review, 1985). As stated “Weapons programs must now manage a 
gauntlet of paperwork, which is burdensome and embarks more costs than are saved by 
the safeguards” (National Review, 1985). Vs. the actual quote: Weapons programs must 
now run a gauntlet of paperwork so burdensome and devious as to add far more to their 
cost than is ever saved by the safeguards. 
The commitment by Congress to help manage and oversee acquisition programs 
has resulted in a number of laws that were intended to ensure systems would be designed 
for integration and interoperability but now these same laws are used as a shield by 
program managers to limit the system of systems integration that is now required as 
technology has advanced. 
The following pages provide summations and analysis of I2 in regards to the 
description and application of the laws. 
C. STATUTORY LAWS 
Extensive review of statutory laws was conducted to locate integration and 
interoperability references. These statutory findings were identified in the following 
public laws: Public Law 104-106 104th Congress, Feb. 10, 1996, Public Law 105-261 
105th Congress, Oct. 17, 1998, and Public Law 107-314, 107th Congress, Dec. 2, 2002.  
The Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996 and the Federal 
Acquisition Reform Act (FARA) of 1996 were combined to become the Clinger-Cohen 
Act of 1996 (CCA) and is part of Public Law 104-106 104th Congress, Feb. 10, 1996. 
This law was designed to improve the way the federal government conducts procurement 
activities, requires the use of standards for better integration and increases the 
incorporation of commercial technology. 
Appendix A contains just a few examples of how I2 is used in this law. 
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D. REGULATORY LAWS 
Regulatory law consists of policies and procedures required to administer the 
statutory laws passed by Congress and signed by the President (The University of 
Delaware Library, 2006). Appendix B provides an understanding of the regulatory laws, 
Joint Publications 1 and 6, Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Instructions, and DoD 
Instruction 4630.8, “Procedures for Interoperability and Supportability of Information 
Technology (IT) and National Security Systems (NSS) governing I2 required for C4I 
systems. 
E. SUMMARY 
As described in this chapter, there are many Statutory and Regulatory laws on the 
books today that ensure I2. The catalyst for these laws in most cases was due to a few 
acquisition programs that did not perform due diligence regarding the spending of 
program funding or became the target of blame as a way of distracting attention from the 
real causes. Regardless of why each of these laws were written, they all seem to be 
reaction-based by Congress and others to “help” ensure the engineering and acquisition 
of future programs.  
DoD has placed great importance on making our system of systems interoperable 
and integrated and requires that all new (and many existing) systems demonstrate they 
are interoperable with other systems and become certified as interoperable prior to 
fielding.  DoD relies on the Joint Interoperability Test Command (JITC, part of the 
Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA)) to certify systems. In doing so, JITC 
reviews testing already conducted as well as assessments prepared by independent testing 
organizations. It may also conduct some of its own testing. The results are submitted to 
the Joint Staff, who validate the system’s certification. Systems are generally certified for 
three years—after which they must be re-certified. 
Even with these laws in place with oversight by OSD NII and DISA, programs 
still perform minimum I2 testing.  
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As of December 10, 2002, 24 of the 26 elements from the Distributed Common 
Ground-Surface Systems (DCGS) had been fielded without being JITC certified. Only 
after the United States Government Accountability Office published the report, 03-329 in 
2003, “Steps Needed to Ensure Interoperability of Systems That Process Intelligence 
Data,” did the DCGS program office take corrective action toward these issues.  
The design of warfighting capabilities through the use of net-centric I2 systems 
will most likely not be accomplished by more laws and more GAO reports. Without a 
doubt, accountability and real programmatic penalties need to be defined and enforced to 




III. RESEARCH OF SUCCESSFUL INTEGRATION AND 
INTEROPERABILITY OF SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS DESIGNS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis will demonstrate the understanding of I2 of systems across a system of 
systems design and how I2 is applied to a system of systems framework. 
At this point, a review of the different levels of system of systems is important to 
show how system integration can be defined and utilized in various ways depending on 
the type of system being integrated, process for integration, and the methods in which a 
system is bound for analysis. Through reviewing the work of Hobday, Davies, & 
Prencipe, 2005, Table 1 displays the spectrum of technical systems a program manager 




Large Technical System of 
Systems
A4 B4 C4 D4
3
Product-System
A3 B3 C3 D3
2
Component/Subsystem
A2 B2 C2 D2
1
Assembly
A1 B1 C1 D1
A B C D
Low-Tech Medium-Tech High-Tech Super High-Tech
Technological uncertainty/novelty  
Table 1.   A Simple Typology of Technological Systems 
The technical systems range from the scope of the system (physical nature and 




• Low-Tech = Systems that have no new technology required at any stage 
system integration is not required. 
• Medium-Tech = Systems that have some new technology, system 
integration is unlikely to impact project. 
• High-Tech = Systems that consists of recently developed technology, 
system integration is likely to pose issues. 
• Super High-Tech = Systems that depend on new knowledge, skills, and 
materials are rare and rely on emerging technologies. 
Program management should understand to which cell a program belongs in order 
to help bound the project and effectively utilize the model framework that will be 
presented in Chapter V. To this end, each type of system of systems would have a 
corresponding model framework that structures the system of systems categorized by a 
cell in Table 1. In applying the framework, some models would be similar in structure 
and content, some might be significantly different. Numerous examples are identified and 
developed in this thesis. As the programs are described in this chapter and Chapter IV, 
this table will be referenced for system of systems and technical level to provide a 
visualization to set the foundation for the system of systems framework introduced in 
Chapter V of this thesis. 
In Table 1, whether the system of scope is assembly/low-tech (A1) or a system of 
systems/super high tech (D4), as technology changes, a system of systems approach 
enables people, technical systems, and organizations to effectively and efficiently adapt 
to change as needed in real-time to accommodate changing situations. A Homeland 
Security – SAFECOM (2008), system of systems brochure outlines the major concepts 
that are fundamental to successful system of systems: 
• Systems are comprised of human, technological, and organizational 
components. 
• Governance, technology, standard operating procedures, training, and 
utilization are important relationships. 
• Independently operating systems can work with other systems and not lose 
their independence. 
These are important considerations when examining the attributes of successful 
and unsuccessful I2 descriptions in this chapter. 
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To this point, the various system scopes, level of technology, and concepts of 
importance in relation to the success of I2 have been discussed. Another critical aspect of 
I2 is the topic of “interfaces.” Standard (common) interfaces can help in integrating 
equipment, systems, and programs that are not compatible. This can provide operational, 
technological, and economic advantages as shown in Table 2 (SAFECOM, 2008).  
 
Increased Decreased 
Operations by anywhere, anytime network 
to work upon authorization. 
Reliance on proprietary technology 
enabling choice of vendors 
Capability improved if system is based on 
standards to connect to other systems 
without compromising functionality. 
Cost reduction because less costly 
customized interoperable solutions and 
training can be standardized. 
Efficiency because the need for additional 
resources to improve interoperability 
decreases. 
 
Flexibility to upgrade without affecting 
other standard-based system. 
 
Capacity to expand is more likely with a 
standard interface versus proprietary. 
 
Table 2.   Advantages of Standard Interfaces 
Table 2 highlights the major advantages toward successful interfacing which 
supports interoperability that ensures integration. As Engebretson (2007) states, “When 
you have achieved that interoperability, the next step is integration, which we define as 
the ability for one device or software to be operated by another.” As the various programs 
are reviewed in this thesis, examples of criticality of interfaces will surface. 
As much as interfaces are critical to system of systems I2, the topic of boundaries 
within and between systems requires discussion. Today we utilize custom and 
commercial off the shelf products that need third party technology for integration to 
occur. This makes it difficult to ensure I2, and when boundaries blur, it becomes even 
harder. This can be especially challenging if the boundaries begin to get fuzzy especially 
when dealing with the difference between a system of systems and a single, complex 
distributed system (Smith, Carney, & Morris, 2005). For example, a single shipboard 
diesel generator, as opposed to several diesel generators operating in parallel, would 
constitute a complex system - several parallel diesel generators being a system of 
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complex systems. The load following characteristics of a single unit is significantly 
different than the load following characteristics of several units in parallel. If this 
emergent behavior is not appreciated and understood, the system can easily be unstable 
(Turso, Ainsworth, Dusang, Miller, & Smith, 2007). Basically, determining whether a 
system is bound or unbound is critical. For a managed and engineered system, most likely 
the emergent behavior is not positive because the requirements dictate what the customer 
wants and most often the emergent behavior that surfaces from the system does not align 
with the customer requirements. 






result in SoS emergent 
behavior  
Figure 1. System of Systems – Emergent Behaviors 
• System A interfaces with System B, bounded because the behavior is 
anticipated and stable. 
• System C, new to the scene, interfaces with System B, bounded because 
the behavior is anticipated and stable. 
• Emergent behaviors for the SoS due to unanticipated interactions between 
System A and System C result in an unbounded system of systems.  
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This is especially pronounced when incorporating human interaction among 
System A and C - essentially, System B is a human system component of a system of 
systems. 
B. BACKGROUND 
As stated in Chapter II, the pressure of funding, scheduling, and performance, for 
government as well as industry, amplifies the challenges of designing complex systems. 
Complex systems, once merged, result in joint system of systems, which enables the I2 of 
a system of systems to be a collection of different systems designed for their own purpose 
and combined to produce a very large new system (National Research Council, 2007).  
The idea of a successful system of systems depends on the perspective of the 
definition of “successful.” For many programs within the DoD, the definition of 
successful is related to spending the appropriated program funding on time or fielding the 
systems on time. With performance being the third part of program management, it is 
important to understand how other programs balance performance trade-offs as a function 
of successful system of systems I2. 
A successful program from an I2 perspective is a program that achieves seamless 
integration with other elements of a larger system of systems and provides timely and 
accurate interoperability to the system of systems capabilities. Improved coordination of 
initiatives and programs through authoritative oversight of related concepts, I2 efforts are 
paramount to achieve an overall capability (Rogers, 2003). 
Another perspective is how the DoD views system of systems integration as a 
method to pursue development, integration, interoperability, and optimization of systems 
to enhance performance in future battlefield scenarios (Pei, 2000). As seen in the DoD,  
this success is based on formal and derived requirements that ensure operational 
satisfaction of the customers from the Initial Operation Capability (IOC) and through the 
lifecycle of the system.  
Without appropriate funding and scheduling for programs, performance, i.e., I2, 
can be compromised. The situation becomes more complicated when the DoD’s 
  14
requirements process generates more demand for new programs than fiscal resources can 
support across many highly complex and interdependent programs. In addition, because 
programs are funded annually and department wide, cross-portfolio priorities have not 
been established. Therefore, competition for funding continues over time, forcing 
programs to view success as the ability to secure the next funding increment rather than 
delivering capabilities as promised (United States Government Accountability Office 
[GAO], 2005). All of these factors can contribute to the overall failure of programs. 
Failure can often force a system’s design back to the drawing board for correction 
to ensure performance. For system of systems failures, the correction can be difficult to 
quantitatively define as to who or what system(s) should incorporate the changes. 
Performance failures are not a bad condition in a holistic perspective. During a speech at 
the University of Delaware, Henry Petroski and Aleksandar S. Vesic Professor of Civil 
Engineering and Professor of History at Duke University stated, “Imagine that the Titanic 
had not hit an iceberg. Imagine that the Titanic had successfully reached New York. It 
would have been hailed as a tremendous success. What would have been the 
consequences of that?” (Parmley, 2006). 
The challenges of successful I2 design from a system of systems perspective can 
be related to the advancement in technology and the use of common off–the-shelf 
(COTS) items. The advancement of technology spurred the creation of companies and 
products that claimed to be integrated and interoperable. The number of COTS-based 
systems in the military has increased from 28% in 1997 to 70% in 2002. The issue is 
related to the COTS products with their own set of assumptions, which are not always 
compatible with other systems/components in the system of systems (Bhuta, 2007).  
The purpose of I2 C4I, a system of systems, is the robust and limitless capability 
of providing commanders with situational awareness. In contrast, the purposes of 
accounting systems are for business management, preparation for tax filing, analysis of 
buy and sell trends, etc. The purpose of C4I systems is to provide data to the right person, 
at the right time, displayed in the most effective manner for the end-user(s), which is the 
definition of right in this context. Like the definition of “successful,” the definition of 
“right” can be part of the problem.  
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For C4I based system of systems, I2 requirements are difficult to define. 
Requirements for system of systems are best defined from a user’s perspective and from a 
capability perspective with traceable requirements to the next lower level down.  
In most cases, C4I functional requirements are at a very high level. The lower 
levels, such as display and user interface attributes, of how a system’s design is derived 
can be lost within the individual program and assumptions are formulated. For I2, this 
level of detail assures multiple systems are all starting with the same system of systems 
requirements. This is normally not the case with new capabilities and new features being 
developed and fielded into system of systems environments that were not designed with 
these extended or enhanced capabilities.  
The net-centric and joint warfighter is the way of the future, across individual 
programs and across the DoD services I2 is the challenge of C4I for years to come. The 
success of this integration and level of interoperability will not come without failures. 
Leveraging the successful programs to the fullest extent possible is one of the keys to 
ensure I2. 
C. CRITERIA USED FOR SELECTION OF PROGRAMS 
There are thousands if not hundreds of thousands of system of systems today 
within the DoD and commercial domains. Some are as complex as the phone system and 
others are as complex as the Space Shuttle or the sensor grid to detect worldwide missile 
launches. The approach used to evaluate some of these programs was based on multiple 
criteria, which highlighted the successes or difficulties to achieve integration and a high 
level of interoperability. 
The commercial and DoD engineering environments are driven by different 
factors. For the commercial market, the engineering is based on time to market to 
capitalize on sales balanced against the cost of the product and the risk of brand name 
degradation or lawsuits over defective products. The driver is revenue. The building of a 
system that never fails is cost and time prohibited. Designing failure safeguards into 
systems that detect a failure is the most reasonable approach to systems designs.  
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Systems built by the DoD are driven by requirements developed by contractors, in 
many cases, approved, as the government requirements, by capability officers in the 
services and provided to the acquisition offices to implement the contract. The issues of 
stable and quantifiable requirements and funding that allow an I2 design to be developed 
often initiates the problem of non-integrated and non-interoperable systems.  
To understand the I2 of a system design, consideration needs to be given to the 
maturity of the interfaces, data management, and systems hardware/software design. For 
example, to meet a requirement of fast and fixed latencies i.e., real-time, radar tracking, 
guidance alignment within a system of systems design, the engineering of the I2 needs to 
be deliberate and well tested. There are other system designs that require I2 to be near-
real-time (i.e., common operating picture, chat) which are not reliant on rigid and fixed 
latency of communication or processes. Regardless, the system engineering to ensure I2 
in these systems (i.e., real-time or near-real time) is based on ensuring data is provided to 
the correct place in the correct format at the correct time. The programs selected for this 
thesis are based on innovative technologies and/or programs. The idea is to select 
programs that have or are being designed with I2 verses experimental programs that are 
focused on technology advancements. 
D. OVERVIEW OF PROGRAMS 
These are successful programs that have, or will be required to design and 
implement, an I2 system of systems design. To evaluate the success (or failures) of these 
designs, it is important to understand the scope and the drivers for each of the programs. 
The following describes five system of systems that have been successfully integrated 
and interoperable: NASA Space Shuttle and Apollo Program, Army’s Future Combat 
System Program, Department of Transportation Railway Controls Initiative, DoD Joint 
Distributed Common Ground Systems Program, and an Enterprise’s Learning 
Management System. 
1. NASA Space Shuttle and Apollo Program 
The NASA Space Shuttle program started in 1972 with a government contract to 
Rockwell International for $2.6 billion. The I2 of the shuttle and mission critical 
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requirements of the program drove much of the system’s design. In 1976, the first test 
shuttle was rolled out to begin the Approach and Landing Test (ALT) program. The nine-
month long ALT program involved ground and flight tests. These tests included the 
integration testing of various C4 equipment used in the handling and control capabilities 
required for atmospheric flight. 
From the start, the Space Shuttle program used a systematic approach to the 
system of systems design that evaluated and tested the I2 of the design from 1972 to the 
first earth orbit in 1981. System I2 has been part of the program life-cycle support. In 
2000, the Space Shuttle Atlantis introduced a host of enhancements including adaptation 
of the glass cockpit system, the use of radar to communicate with the ground, and a 
linked NASA satellite that allowed crews to transmit television-like pictures, voice 
messages and high speed data streams (Boeing, 2008). 
The engineering and systematic approach to the design of the Apollo program was 
used with the Space Shuttle program as a basis for the program’s systems engineering. In 
the fall of 2005, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) used the Space Shuttle 
program as a part of an Aircraft System Engineering course taught at MIT by Professor 
Aaron Cohen who was the Space Shuttle Orbiter Project Manager. The course offers a 
holistic view of the program from basic systems engineering, through risk analysis and 
management, and covers the key design drivers and decisions that attributed to the 
systems design and operational success of the program (MIT, 2005). 
There are a number of interesting perspectives on I2 and Systems Engineering 
within the Apollo Program and Space Shuttle program. Back in the 1960s during the 
Apollo program, NASA discussed “What is Systems Engineering?” Part of the NASA 
systems engineering process included making decisions in a timely matter. NASA’s 
decision making process was based on sixty percent confidence level in the selection of 
the course of actions to baseline design solutions. From NASA’s perspective, more than 
sixty percent confidence resulted in delayed decisions and most likely caused rework of 
designs (MIT, 2005).  
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An Interface Control Document (ICD) describes the interface(s) of a system and 
is key to the decision making process. There is a chicken and the egg paradox as it related 
to ICD and systems designs. This paradox in an ICD cannot be established until the 
system is designed but a system design cannot be completed until the Interface Control 
Documents is established. ICDs used by the Space Shuttle program include mechanic, 
electrical, functional, and data ICDs (MIT, 2005).   
Requirements definitions were considered the hardest part of system engineering 
with interface management being part of the requirements definition effort. With a 
system of systems approach, the use of a matrix management of program engineering 
with checks and balances independent of the program is considered one of the keys to 
NASA’s success of Apollo and Space Shuttle programs (MIT, 2005). 
Some of the lessons learned include: establishment of interface working groups 
with mandatory participation, bringing in discipline experts when needed and not 
hesitating to go outside the program, government oversight of integrated testing with full-
time Integration and Test leads required, monitored funding to ensure systems 
engineering activities are not cut during restructuring of programs, performing end-to-end 
testing early and defining integration leads before the design phase starts, giving adequate 
time to subsystem level testing and data system integration testing, and not short-cutting 
subsystems testing (MIT, 2005). 
2. Future Combat System Program 
The Future Combat System (FCS) is the Army’s modernization program that 
integrates technology with combat teams and provides improved situational awareness 
and communications. FCS supports the asymmetric ground warfare that is within the 
Army’s mission area. The FCS concept was initiated in 1999 with the timeline to deliver 
multiple capability fielding starting in 2008, equip the first brigade combat team in 2015, 
and equip fifteen brigades in 2030. As of April 2008, there are 75 FCS tests and 
evaluations ongoing across the United States. This program is on schedule while using a 
holistic system of systems acquisition approach (Army FCS Program Manger, 2008) 
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The I2 of the FCS program is based on 18 networked warfighting systems which 
is the core of all FCS components. The networked systems model used by the FCS 
program allows the integrations of situational awareness, sensor fusion, and networked 
fires which are all capabilities that are part of Joint (service agnostic) warfare that relies 
on integrated solutions (GAO, 2003).  
The FCS program established an overall System of Systems Integration Lab 
(SoSIL) network to support the interaction and integration of all the parts and pieces that 
makeup the FCS program. The software requirements verification and formal integration 
testing is key to the identification, troubleshooting, and isolation of integration problems. 
At the core of the FCS program is the FCS software suite with a mid-ware called 
SoSCOE. 
SoSCOE stands for System of Systems Common Operating Environment. Some 
define it as the “glue” that ties FCS together as a critical FCS net-centric information 
environment. All C4I systems within FCS are required to have SoSCOE built into the 
operating systems. SoSCOE provides the internal FCS information delivery and 
management mechanisms; ensure interoperability services, security and information 
assurance services, and information discovery capabilities (Bassett & Emery, 2005). 
FCS can be characterized as a complex adaptive system and, once fielded, will 
exhibit emergent properties that cannot be understood or predicted by studying the 
system elements in isolation. This assertion is based on four observations (Hartley, 2005).  
• Warfighting itself is increasingly being recognized as a complex adaptive 
system. War is a multi-layered human enterprise. As such, it has many of 
the features studied in complexity theory work that is focused on social 
systems and economics. 
• Modern war's focus on the role of information is generally increasing 
interconnectedness that will, in turn, tend to sharpen the effects of its 
complexity. Specifically, emergence, a key attribute of complex adaptive 
systems, is characterized in the complexity literature as an effect of 
system-level attributes related to information flows and distributed 
knowledge. Emergences is also caused by interactions of systems across 
system boundaries – this is best understood when system of systems are 
modeled using SysML, a graphical modeling language used in systems 
engineering, http://www.sysml.org/. 
  20
• The technological systems that FCS relies upon have very similar 
architectural elements to recognized complex systems. For example, 
communications and agent technologies are both current topics in complex 
systems research. 
• The shaping of the FCS system of systems emergent properties and 
behaviors must be treated as an operational requirement. The basis upon 
which System of systems integration is possible may lie entirely in how 
well commonalities are exploited once determined. 
The FCS will be a multi-functional, multi-mission, re-configurable system of 
systems that maximize joint inter-operability, strategic transportability and commonality 
of mission roles including direct and indirect fire, air defense, reconnaissance, troop 
transport, counter mobility, non-lethal and C2 on the move. The goal of this effort is to 
develop a network-centric advanced force structure, quantify its benefits, and identify 
material solutions and technologies within the context of that force. It will also identify 
Doctrine, Operational, Training, Leader and Material (DOTLM) specific changes 
necessary as a result of the development of this network centric advanced force structure 
(Federation of American Scientists, 2000). 
The FCS program has several progressive features, but also faces a number of 
challenges such as setting requirements, developing systems, financing development and 
managing the effort (GAO, 2005). The FCS concept shows the Army leadership is 
thinking innovatively to arrive at best practices to prepare for future Army operations. 
For example, Army leaders decided to include interoperability with other system 
requirements in the FCS design and design the individual FCS systems to work as part of 
a networked system of systems. Collectively, the system of systems could still provide an 
effective combat capability even if some of the individual system capabilities are lost or 
degraded (GAO, 2003). 
This networked system model represents an improvement over the previous 
approach of first developing individual systems and later integrating which is an  
approach that often leads to schedule and cost growth. The system of systems approach 
provides program managers more flexibility to make trade-offs among the individual 
systems. 
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3. Rail Controls 
Digital communication technologies are revolutionizing not only the 
telecommunications industry, but the railroad industry as well. Intelligent Transportation 
Systems (ITS) for highways and mass transit are based on these technologies, as are the 
new air traffic control and maritime vessel tracking systems. The military services, the 
major parcel delivery companies, pipeline operators, and police, fire, and ambulance 
services also use these technologies. The Federal Railroad Administration and the 
railroad industry are working on the development of Intelligent Railroad Systems that 
would incorporate the new digital communications technologies into train control, 
braking systems, grade crossings, defect detection, and into planning and scheduling 
systems. Intelligent Railroad Systems will improve the safety, security, and efficiency of 
freight, inter-city passenger, and commuter railroads (United States Department of 
Transportation [USDOT], 2002). 
The highest priority of the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) is the safety of 
the railroad system, the railroad personnel, and general public. Despite the improvement 
in railroad safety, there are still many railroad accidents of all types. With a goal of 
significantly reducing accidents and casualties, the FRA is aiming its research activities 
at addressing safety issues in each and every technological area that can reduce both the 
probability and severity of accidents (USDOT, 2002). 
One technology being utilized is digital data link communications networks which 
provide the means for moving information to and from trains, maintenance-of-way 
equipment, switches and wayside detectors, control centers, yards, intermodal terminals, 
passenger stations, maintenance facilities, operating data systems, and customers. Data 
link communications will replace or supplement many of today’s routine voice 
communications with non-voice digital messages and will effectively increase the 
capacity of available communications circuits and frequencies. Data link communications 
will utilize radio frequencies to communicate to and from mobile assets, and between 
locomotives in a train block using a variety of transmission media (owned either by 
railroads or commercial telecommunications carriers) to communicate between fixed 
facilities. These media include microwave radio, fiber optic cable, buried copper cable, 
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cellular telephones, communications satellites, and even traditional pole lines. With data 
link communications, the information is digitally coded and messages can be discretely 
addressed to individual or multiple recipients (USDOT, 2002). 
In addition, the U.S. Government, through the Federal Communications 
Commission, has assigned to the railroad industry 182 frequencies in the VHF band (160 
MHz) and six pairs of frequencies in the UHF band (900 MHz). The UHF frequencies are 
being used for digital communications; and some railroads have converted some of their 
assigned VHF frequencies from analog to digital communications. The conversion is 
expected to accelerate during the coming decade (USDOT, 2002). 
Upon reviewing all the preceding examples, integration and interoperability are 
considered one of the major challenges to an Intelligent Railroad System. In the early 
1990’s, railroad chief executives considered the implementation of intelligent railroad 
systems, but decided instead to use available railroad capital for mergers and acquisitions, 
believing the mergers and acquisitions would yield a higher rate of return. The mergers, 
which resulted in four large railroads that carry over 90 percent of the rail freight in the 
United States, were not well executed and did not generate forecasted returns. 
Consequently, the major railroads do not believe they have the capital needed for 
investment in network-centric railroading and intelligent railroad systems. In fact, several 
of the large railroads are struggling to handle recent increases in freight traffic caused by 
the economic recovery, increased imports, the truck driver shortage, and highway 
congestion. However, they are investing in the construction of double-tracks, which 
provide capacity benefits in only a limited territory, rather than in tools to help them 
better manage their traffic flows over their entire network. Most senior railroad managers 
received their management experience in an environment of downsizing and cost-cutting; 
few have experience managing growth (Ditmeyer, 2005).  
Railroads are currently not organized well for implementing intelligent railroad 
systems. The groups responsible for telecommunications and for train control systems are 
often in disparate parts of railroad organizations. Telecommunications staff often report 
to the information systems department, while train control staff often report to the track  
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engineering and maintenance department. Network-centric railroading requires that 
telecommunications and train control staffs either be amalgamated or have an extremely 
close working relationship (Ditmeyer, 2005). 
Interoperability issues effect some but not all of the intelligent railroad systems. 
Locomotives equipped with radios using common frequencies and protocols, with 
common positioning systems, and with computers using common logic are necessary if 
Positive Train Control systems are to be implemented widely. Since the two types of 
electronically-controlled pneumatic brake systems are not interoperable, the railroad 
industry must decide which will be the industry standard. Other systems, such as tactical 
and strategic traffic planners, locomotive health monitoring systems, work order 
reporting systems, and wayside equipment sensors, do not require railroad industry 
agreement (Ditmeyer, 2005). 
With the oversight and test facilities within the Federal Railroad Administration, a 
common governance and common criteria have been established for implementation an 
intelligent railroad systems. The FRA is able to test and certify individual systems that 
make up the system of systems capabilities of this high tech transportation structure. This 
ensures interoperability between systems given they have been tested in a real-world 
environment. 
When new technologies are adopted and methods of operation change, it is only 
natural that some individuals, and even institutions, will be resistant to change. Those 
with knowledge of signal systems feel threatened by the adoption of a different train 
control technology. Some management will want to move the new, different, and more 
complete information through the existing stovepipes of the hierarchical structure, rather 
than directly to those managers and operators who can take immediate action based on 
the information. The United States military encountered this problem during Operation 
Iraqi Freedom (Talbot, 2004). 
4. DoD Joint Distributed Common Ground Systems Program 
The purpose of an intelligence sensor is to gather data from ground and surface 
systems. The categories of these sensors are celestial (satellite) or terrestrial airplanes and 
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unmanned ground sensors. The sensors provide raw data for the purpose of tracking, 
mapping and navigation, search and exploration, surveillance and reconnaissance.  
In an operational context, these sensor systems consists of the data collection 
system and the ground terminal or ground system. Example 1): An Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle (UAV) is the data collection unit and the ground system is the computer and 
communication suite that controls, re-directs, and gathers data from the UAV while in-
flight. 2) A U2 or F18 aircraft is the data collection unit and the Tactical Exploitation 
Group system retrieves the data and performs data fusion on the raw data to create 
“Actionable Intelligence.”  
Distributed Common Ground Systems (DCGS) is the Defense Airborne 
Reconnaissance Office (DARO) vision for the integrated architecture of all 
ground/surface systems. The DARO strategy is for DCGS to integrate the: 
• Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) ground/surface systems in the Common 
Imagery Ground/Surface System (CIGSS) architecture,  
• Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) ground/surface systems in the Joint 
Airborne SIGINT Architecture (JASA), and 
• CIGSS and JASA architectures into DCGS.  
DCGS will be completed by the addition of IMINT, SIGINT, and Measurement 
and Signature Intelligence (MASINT), which includes radar, infrared, acoustic, and 
nuclear intelligence (Pike, 2005). 
The purposes of a DCGS test bed environment are to accomplish air-ground 
interoperability testing, support sensor development, evaluate CIGSS components, and 
support CIGSS architecture standards development in a mobile lab that could support 
rapid development, demonstration and evaluation of new capabilities. There are 
significant advantages to a mobile lab for sensor development, including co-locating with 
contractors to develop Interface Control Documents and risk reduction, co-locating with 
airframe contractors to verify sensor-to-ground station connectivity, and co-locating with 
government/contractors for final flight test Interface Control Documents verification. The 
test bed has an expanding role in SIGINT and MASINT disciplines and the test bed is 
involved in CIGSS level one and two certification programs.  
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The DCGS is a family of fixed and deployable multi-source ground processing 
systems that support a range of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems 
such as national and commercial satellite systems, U-2, UAVs, and F-16 Theater 
Airborne Reconnaissance Systems. The U-2 Management Directorate at Robins Air 
Logistics Center provides upgrades of operational intelligence support systems to meet 
DCGS operational requirements for deployable ground stations.  
Fielding of DCGS will be accomplished through the successful completion of a 
series of DCGS Migration Blocks. These blocks represent the planned fielding of new 
DCGS systems/capabilities and sites, and upgrades of existing functionality. No 
significant hardware or software development is envisioned for the DCGS Integration 
Support Contractor (DISC). The range of services will include, but not be limited to, 
system engineering, integration, planning, and maintaining an understanding of planned 
upgrades to Community ISR systems. A primary objective is to ensure current and future 
interoperability between AF DCGS and C2 systems (Pike, 2005). 
The Distributed Common Ground/Surface System-Marine Corps (DCGS-MC) is 
a subset of the Marine Air-Ground Intelligence System (MAGIS) network. MAGIS 
provides the capability to collect, process, analyze, fuse, and disseminate information 
derived from all Marine organic intelligence disciplines—including Imagery Intelligence, 
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Measurement and Signatures Intelligence, and Human 
Source Intelligence as well as national and theater systems. DCGS-MC meets specific 
Department of Defense requirements and connects intelligence professionals to multi-
discipline joint, national and organic data sources, analytical assessments, and collection 
assets.  
To meet the increased interoperability and data posting/sharing requirements 
levied by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), as well as the requirements for 
timely and accurate intelligence demanded by Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare, DCGS-
MC will transform from a partially networked family of systems to an enterprise 
encompassing all of Marine Corps Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) 
assets and be fully interoperable with other Services, Agencies and COCOMs (HQMC, 
2004). 
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This enterprise solution will be called the Marine Corps ISR Enterprise (MCISR-
E). MCISR-E is an enterprise that encompasses the entire Intelligence Cycle in order to 
better assist the USMC operational planning and decision-making processes (HQMC, 
2004). 
There are many pitfalls to I2 of DCGS. ‘Who leads the effort?’ seems to be a 
common question with few answers. How to avoid protected territories of past programs 
is another roadblock to I2 because every program seems to create new infrastructures. 
As the network provides great connectivity and multiplying effect, it also provides 
a common path for enemies to access all of our systems. As systems connect to the 
network, whether local or dispersed, they publish their services. These services provide 
everything that the other system needs to make use of that service. A key point for this 
approach is that both the service consumer (client) and service provider (server) parts of 
the software are developed, tested and validated by the same contractor (the service 
provider). This is thought to drastically cut down the issues of interoperability due to 
incorrect implementation of the ICD. Also, since this approach assumes a standard 
network connection, it is much simpler and cheaper to implement (no custom hardware or 
connectors). 
DCGS is striving for a single service model and single contractor, with a common 
concept of identity that allows services to create one architecture to be utilized by 
services from a different architecture. This should allow C4ISR applications to be 
common among these architectures (Morris, 2006).  
The Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS) Integration Backbone (DIB) is 
an open-architecture designed to provide interoperability at the data services level for all 
the U.S. military and coalition services. The DIB is a set of common interface standards 
and tools that allow seamless intelligence data sharing and collaboration across the 
C4ISR enterprise of enterprises, delivering the right information at the right time to 
maximize operational effectiveness (Morris, 2006). 
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5. Learning Management System 
A Learning Management System (LMS) enables the delivery, management, and 
administration of training for an enterprise. It supports an integrated approach to training 
by combining computer based and traditional classroom training. This system of systems 
provides centralized content, student management, and reporting in one technology 
package. One of the key attributes to a LMS is the open interface that enables the ability 
to download employee information and upload performance and completion data. These 
interfaces support basic integration of computer language formats as XML and industry 
standards, including IMS, SCORM, and AICC (Robbins, 2002).  
For the purpose of this thesis, the enterprise and manager will not be named since 
it does not impact the thesis results. The manager for “Education Systems” of “Enterprise 
A” was interviewed to discover if the implementation of the LMS for that enterprise was 
successful in the areas of I2 both on the technical and human side.  
The two business drivers of a LMS for this enterprise were 1) cost economies of 
scale and 2) cultural aspect by bringing divisions together to form a whole-one enterprise. 
The overall purpose was to maintain the employee training records and 
certification. This enables movement of personnel and training across divisions; 
therefore, interoperability on the human side. Basically, if an employee goes to another 
sector within the company, their records are in sync. The benefit of “one” place for all 
information is because each division has an interoperable system which feeds into a 
larger system. The interviewee pointed out this seamless approach could happen because 
of two factors: 1) the high tech culture of this enterprise was conducive for this type of 
large scale software application and 2) decision was made in the design phase not to 
modify the software but instead modify business processes. The second factor was 




The manager stated the upfront driver for I2 as a capability was the legacy system 
did not contain I2. Therefore, the system was very inefficient with large amounts of 
rework. For example, certifications and education were located into two separate systems 
along with a manual effort of matching training with qualifications. This process also had 
records located across the company without any central authority.  
To ensure I2, a governing committee was established that provided oversight to all 
aspects of the requirements, purchase and operations of the system. It was, and still is 
post-implementation, an integrated effort from all divisions of the enterprise. Examples 
of the current I2 are: 
• a nightly feed of elearning information is captured through an automated 
and standardized process throughout the enterprise and 
• the LMS has been integrated with SkillSoft, a third party elearning 
software system, (http://skillsoft.com). This was seamless because the 
SkillSoft integration was a bidding requirement from the beginning of the 
project. 
There are future plans to integrate with other third parties because the interface is 
present and can be modified as needed. Using LMS structure provided I2 that provides 
efficiency, accuracy and effectiveness. In essence, both I2 was successful on the technical 
and human side of this project. 
E. SUMMARY  
Each of the programs described within this chapter has challenges and approaches 
to ensure achievable I2 solutions. The requirement for I2 comes from the need for human 
safety, efficient situational awareness, or seamless intelligence data sharing. The hurdles 
in many cases are related to implementation strategies. 
The current implementation strategies are 1) a firm governance structure from the 
use of a single contractor or a single program office (e.g., NASA, FCS), 2) funding and 
contracting to a single I2 company for other programs (e.g., DCGS), and 3) 
implementation of very simple I2 solutions. 
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The programs described in this chapter had I2 networks and sustained lab facilities 
to test and evaluate new spinouts, modules, or new elements of the larger system of 
systems capabilities. The funding for these efforts were not discussed because funding of 
facilities for system of systems testing is considered part of the overall program 
requirement to identify issues, correct the problem, and retest to ensure I2.  
The idea that I2 systems can be legislated, as demonstrated in Chapter II, or just 
naturally occur is not the case. This chapter highlights several successful programs 
relating to I2 and the knowledge and heuristics gleaned from research and interviews. 
This analysis will be synthesized in Chapter V through a descriptive, normative and 
prescriptive model comprising a system of systems framework to provide categorization 
of attributes to introduce a best practice approach to applying I2 to system of systems 
(Valerdi, Ross, & Rhodes, 2007). The methodology for this framework will be defined 
and applied in Chapter V.  
The challenge remains….. How to integrate and create interoperability between 
systems that are independently developed? 
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IV. RESEARCH OF UNSUCCESSFUL INTEGRATION AND 
INTEROPERABILITY OF SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS DESIGNS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter III, the focus was on researching various system of systems programs 
that dealt with large scale system of systems designs that were successful in I2 for a 
number of reasons. The lessons to be learned from successful system of systems I2 are 
key attributes in which a future system of systems I2 should look to repeat. However, the 
lessons learned from examples of non-integration and non-interoperability are equally as 
important. 
The research in this chapter highlights some of the key attributes of non-
integration and non-interoperability seen is various system of systems designs. The 
identification of these attributes in a system of systems design should be an alarm to 
leadership that problems within the design need attention and there is a high risk of I2 
issues. The following describes four system of systems that have been unsuccessful: 
Combat ID, Coast Guard Deepwater Program, Unmanned Air Vehicles, and Enterprise 
Systems. 
B.  OVERVIEW OF PROGRAMS 
1. Combat ID 
Within the fog of war, the enemy is shooting at combat troops and the combat 
troops are returning fire. This battle space includes ground-to-ground, ground-to-air, air-
to-ground, and sea-to-ground/air. Within this battle space, the need for accurate, near-
real-time situational awareness is required. The location and movement of both the 
enemy and friendly forces allows for effective and proportional discharge of deadly 
force.  
The issue of accidental firing on friendly combat troops has been problematic for 
many years. Within the early history of warfare, the two sides of a conflict would enter 
the battlefield with the troops lined up in an open field with bows and arrows, hot oil  
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slight shots, and cannonball projectiles. The asymmetrical warfare of rapid attack, 
displacement, diversion tactics, etc has risk of accidental firing one’s own forces. This 
force-on-same force attack is termed “friendly – fire.” 
In 1995, which was the 50th anniversary of World War II, the Defense Science 
Board (DSB) issued a report that examined the issue of friendly – fire and if/how a 
Combat Identification (Combat ID) could be implemented. The report concluded there 
was not a crisis in Combat ID calling for extraordinary action (DSB, 1996). Given the 
lessons learned from both Gulf Wars, war fighters with theater experience may not agree 
with this finding. 
This same report identified the need for better target recognition capabilities in 
radars on surveillance platforms, increased distributed situational awareness in a netted 
communication environment, and new technology for surveillance, processing and 
reconciling differences in situational awareness (depiction of common operating picture) 
and combat ID.  
The report did not look at Combat ID issues as they relate to dismounted warfare 
in door-to-door large-scale mobile warfare operations. It is important to recognize that 
the Iraq and Afghanistan operations are based on dismounted warfare. Given the DSB 
report did not address what is now the main warfare op (i.e., dismounted), some of the 
conclusions in the report may need to be revisited. From 1996-2001, $12.92 billion was 
spend on C4I but Combat ID funding has been significantly lower. An overriding 
observation is that a heavy investment and continued spending is an important 
requirement for Combat ID for the future (DSB, 1996). 
The negotiated position by the United States and North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) partners regarding Combat ID is to participate with NATO 
Standardization Agreement (STANAG), which determines the processes, procedures, 
terms, and conditions for military or technical procedures or equipment between the 
member countries of the alliance. This partnership will reflect specific Combat IDs 
implementation strategy for both Air domain and Ground domain combat areas but with 
no commitment to upgrade to a single Combat ID. Ground combat is the most serious 
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Combat ID shortfall listed in the report (DSB, 1996). This commitment for commonality 
of a Combat ID method(s) while providing limited specific systems recommendations or 
standards does not provide any significant path forward to unified efforts in this area.  
Coalition partners in the Second Persian Gulf War, i.e., the Iraq War in 2003, 
continue to have integration problems with the United States. Great Britain deployed a 
prototype Combat ID system successfully in 2001. However, after significant time and 
cost spent by the Ministry of Defense (MoD), the British force had difficulties 
communicating effectively with their allies, in particular the United States (Kablenet, 
2007).  
General James Conway, Commandant of the United States Marine Corps 
commanded Marine ground forces during the Iraq war in 2003. With experience from the 
First Persian Gulf War in 1991, basic identification systems were hastily fielded just prior 
to the Iraq War. From General Conway’s perspective, friendly fire incidents were 
“probably my biggest disappointment of the war” (Peck, 2003). 
The Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and Coalition Forces have all been 
developing electronic based Combat ID solutions with few integrated or interoperable 
solutions. The NATO standard that uses millimeter-wave signal is not interoperable with 
United States Forces. The Army’s design that uses a radio based Combat ID does not 
support Marine Corps rifle squad needs with critical firing times.  
With many low-tech visual panels, cloth panels, glo-tape squares and the like, the 
Army has been tweaking its existing Combat ID equipment from these implementations 
into the digital age with a slightly different millimeter-wave form solution mostly focused 
on their track vehicle (i.e., tanks) solutions. This high tech solution is estimated to limit 
casualties to no more than a 3 percent loss. Friendly fire in the first Gulf war is estimated 
at 17 percent of all causalities.  During World War II, friendly fire accounted for about 20 
percent of the causalities (Peck, 2003). Based on these percentages, even though they do 
not concur with the Defense Science Board report, it shows that further investigation is 
required to improve interoperability of Combat ID solutions. 
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A key finding shows that a lack of I2 for Combat ID to resolve friendly fire seems 
to be based on political pressures, which has resulted in suboptimal, non-integration 
solutions by multiple DoD Armed Forces and with limited interoperability between these 
services solutions. This system of systems solution is lacking a cohesive coordinated 
requirement, operational context, and unified commitment to work together.  
Combat ID is at the forefront of all coalition military operations around the globe. 
With continuously changing battlefield environments, rapid evolution of war fighting 
concepts and tactics, and new coalition partners joining the fold, the location and 
recognition, and identification of one’s own forces to reduce fratricide has never been 
more vital. 
As General Conway, USMC, noted, “Whoever comes up with a solution for 
friendly fire, will be very rich, indeed. Because it continues to be something that we see 
happen in the US military, and it’s really something that we’ve got to stop” (Peck, 2003). 
2. Coast Guard Deepwater Program  
Prior to the 1980s, the Coast Guard had few acquisitions of new ships or aircraft. 
The aging fleet of 90+ cutters and patrol boats, 107 aging planes and helicopters, and few 
C4I upgrades over the years resulted in technical obsolescence. This was the genesis for 
the Coast Guard to initiate the Deepwater acquisition effort in the late 1990s. The 
acquisition strategy was based on a single, performance-based contract with all design, 
building, and systems integration to be accomplished by the contractor in a Lead Systems 
Integrator role. Total funding requested in FY02 exceeded $320.2 million with a total 
acquisition cost estimated at $24.23 billion (GAO, 2004). 
The decision by the Coast Guard to hand over all design, build, and systems 
integration responsibility to a contractor was based on a belief that the government 
workforce within the Coast Guard was unable to support the size and complexity of the 
Deepwater program. It was also thought that a performance based contract allowed for 
the best (optimized) common integration across a wide range of platforms.  
  35
By 2003, the Coast Guard through fair and open competition selected a contract 
winner. The contractor was awarded a unique indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity 
contact for 5 years with the option for five more, five year each extensions. 
The Deepwater program is a large system of systems acquisition. The integration 
of advanced ship control and monitoring to reduce ship crews, modernization of C4I 
systems suites, and seamless logistics support for all components seemed to support this 
system of systems approach.  
As early as 2004, many outside observers external to the Coast Guard started to 
raise questions of concern. In March 2004, the GAO -04-380 report criticized not only 
the effectiveness of the contactor and related competency to deliver a quality product but 
questioned the “hands-off” management and engineering decision making by the Coast 
Guard (GAO, 2004). 
The initial warning signs of a troubled acquisition program and a failing system of 
systems integration became real in 2005. The contactor completed the integrated new C4I 
equipment to provide enhanced capabilities and overhauled 49 legacy patrol boats to 
extend the end-of-life for these surface craft. Upon inspection and after operational 
testing, significant structural design flaws and insufficient C4I capabilities that failed to 
meet the documented post 9/11 operational requirement were discovered (Department of 
Homeland Security, 2007). 
Similar problems with the National Security Cutters (NSC) were discovered in 
November 2006. With the design and integration failures building, the Department of 
Homeland Security, Inspector General, Justice Department, General Accountability 
Office, and a wide range of open news organizations proceeded to examine the Coast 
Guard and the Deepwater program. 
A point of interest for C4I system of systems design is the contract focus to utilize 
commercial equipment and software as much as possible (Anderson, Winterstine, 2003). 
The integration of Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) is viewed as plug and play with 
little or no systems I2 testing required. The underestimation of the engineering involved 
for I2 of a COTS solution causes much of the failures in this area. The utilization of 
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COTS should advance the C4I design given there is not a need to build from scratch 
communication hardware, computers, etc. Often a critical aspect in the process is to 
create an architectural C4I baseline with COTS products.  
Another interesting point is that with the urgency to field new and improved 
capabilities in the aftermath of 9/11, the Coast Guard and Department of Homeland 
Security seemed to look for the quick and easy solution instead of a solution that 
provided balanced cost, schedule, and technical risk. Like with many military programs, 
the cost and schedule of programs are underestimated to “win” the program at the 
expense of reducing technical capabilities, which limits I2. The Coast Guard developed an 
aggressive modernization and acquisition program in scale (cost) and urgency (schedule) 
in a single contract with minimal internal review. Additionally, they only provided a brief 
time period to solve unexpected problems and did not follow the system engineering 
process to baseline the level of achievability of the schedule. 
In retrospect, the decision by the Coast Guard to empower the contractor to do a 
majority of system design and integration allowed for minimal technical involvement by 
the government. The contactor and government have very different motivation factors. 
The contactor is motivated by contract awards, incentive fees, and corporate profit. The 
government is motivated by securing funding, successful program execution, maintaining 
an industrial base, and balancing acquisition risk management of cost, schedule and 
performance. This is further complicated by the workforce comprising of government 
officials moving into the industry workforce and vice versa. Regardless of the potential 
conflict of interest by government personnel or unethical behavior by individuals, there 
was a lack of involved competent program managers and systems engineers in the day-to-
day operations and approval cycle. With the acquisition strategy used in the Deepwater 
program, the government oversight for all aspects of the design, development, testing and 
fielding of the system of systems design was clearly missing the aspects of a legally 
binding program or technical authority responsibility.  
In response, the Coast Guard and the Deepwater program made significant 
changes in late 2007. These changes included the “in-sourcing” of the systems integration 
role with the government for all related Deepwater development and the hiring of 
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additional government workforce with both the training, education, and experience to 
effectively support the systems integration and ensure interoperability across platforms. 
In addition, the use of proper design standards and a balanced and realistic design 
schedule with upfront systems engineering activities was base-lined. In the FY09 funding 
request by the Coast Guard, $990.4 million for Deepwater was approved. The cost of the 
flawed acquisition strategy and re-design, re-engineering the C4I suites is estimated at 
well over $500 million to date for the total Deepwater program (Congressional Research 
Service, 2008). 
3. Unmanned Air Vehicles  
The history of Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAV), unpiloted aircraft, is longer than 
one might think. From a warfare perspective, UAV were as simple as a Douglas 
Archibald surveillance kite, Figure 2, which took the first successful aerial photographs 
in 1883. Thereafter, this UAV was used extensively during the Spanish-American War of 
1898 and provided critical information to United States forces.  
 
 
Figure 2. Douglas Archibald Surveillance Kite 1883 
The idea for a UAV to be more than surveillance was conceived by Adolf Hitler 
in the early days of World War II. The Vergeltungswaffe-1 (English translation – 
Revenge Weapon) or V-1, Figure 3, was designed by manufacturers Fieseler Flugzeubau 
and Argus Motoren and was ready for service in 1944-45. 
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Figure 3. V-1 designed by Fieseler and Argus Motoren 
Launched from catapult or host aircraft, the V-1 had a powerful thrust pulsejet 
engine that had a range of up to 150 miles with a 2,000-pound bomb payload. The brain 
of the V-1 was a simple autopilot and a gyrocompass that provided vector control to a 
pre-programmed altitude and speed. Once the V-1 was launched moving in one direction 
from the catapult, it would climb to its set altitude until a pre-set counter/timer triggered 
the arming of the warhead and directed the V-1 into a steep terminal dive (Luftwaffe 
Resource Center, 2008). Although the success of the V-1 is questionable, this was the 
start of powered un-tethered UAV designs and birth of the cruise missile 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/V-1_flying_bomb). 
Following World War II, many countries continued the advancement of air-
breathing UAVs through the 1940-1970s that supported operations during the Cold War 
and the Vietnam War. Also following World War II were the advancements of other 
technologies that took UAVs from a “point and shoot” (one direction) system to 
computer-based remote control and real-time transmitter that are characteristic of today’s 
UAV.  
The development of small and lightweight UAVs like the Scout and Pioneer by 
the Israel military overcame many of the challenges that limited UAVs. The use of the 
Scout UAV by the Israelis in the early 1980s was extremely successful during the Bekaa 
Valley conflict between Israel, Lebanon, and Syria. The inexpensive Scout UAV using 




surveillance camera mounted on the belly of the Scout, located Syrian missile sites and 
allowed Israeli bombers to destroy all but two of the 17 launch sites (http://www.israeli-
weapons.com/weapons/aircraft/uav/scout/Scout.html).     
The aggressive development of UAV capabilities has placed these systems into 
critical warfighting, border patrols surveillance, and humanitarian functions around the 
world. However, the I2 challenges of incorporating UAVs into the high-tech military 
arsenals had problems. 
UAVs range in size from arm-launch planes to the size of small commuter planes. 
The success of UAVs in warzones has proposed the use of UAVs in other mission areas. 
The number of UAVs has increased from fewer than 100 six years ago to 3500 in 2006 
with about 700 operated by the Coast Guard, NASA, Homeland Security, and the 
National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration (USA Today, 2006). The I2 of UAVs 
developed into un-managed or semi-managed radio environments causing significant 
problems and crashes. 
Modern military warfare has continued to push the digital frontier to the tactical 
edge and beyond. A common problem seen during both Gulf Wars has been the radio 
interference and the disregard of spectrum management that has hampered United States 
UAV operations. In 1987, the GAO report 87-42 titled “Radio Frequencies – Earlier 
Coordination Could Improve System Use and Save Cost,” documented the lack of DoD 
management of frequency spectrum in radios, radars, and other critical C4I systems 
which includes UAVs (GAO, 1987). In a follow-on GAO report 01-604 in 2001, the 
GAO found the DoD has taken steps to ensure program managers identify and address 
potential interference problems early in system development (GAO, 2001). For example, 
the new acquisition guidance establishes procedures that require all new weapon systems 
acquisition programs to be reviewed for potential electromagnetic and spectrum 




Even today, the problem of I2 of UAV remains an issue. Based on a report in 
NETWORK WORLD, May 2008, an analysis of information from the DoD on 199 UAV 
crashes that occurred during from 2003-2007 of operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi 
Freedom indicates issues with UAV reliability and lack of protected radio frequency 
spectrum.   
4. Enterprise Joint System 
Enterprise-wide integration dates back to the 1950s and 1960s (Alsene, 1994). 
Throughout the 1990s, leading researchers have claimed that integration is the most 
distinguishing characteristic of a successful large-scale system. As seen in Figure 4, 
(Singletary, 2002), integration has evolved from the simplistic computer program to 
complex Business-to-Business initiatives. 
 
 
Figure 4. History of IT Integration 
Since interoperability supports integration, it appears that I2 is intimately related 
to enterprise systems such as Enterprise Application Integration and Enterprise Resource 
Planning (ERP) (Singletary, 2002). The program described below involves the aspects of 
I2 surrounding an ERP system and a merger of two sites to form one company. 
Since it does not impact the results of this thesis, the enterprise and manager will 
not be named due to confidentiality. The manager for “Organization Change” of 
“Enterprise C” was interviewed to discover if the implementation of a Joint System for 
that enterprise was successful in the areas of I2 both on the technical and human side.  
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The two business drivers for the Joint System were 1) cost economies of scale 
(cheaper to have one system where business transactions result in the same data 
capturing) and 2) cultural aspect by bringing two companies together (merger) to form a 
whole (One Enterprise). At the time, the culture was not conducive for bringing the 
legacy systems into a new system of systems. Since the enterprise and its environment 
have a major impact on whether a system is successful in meeting its mission, this was an 
important factor in the success of this particular software implementation (National 
Research Council, 2007). Historically, the two sites were competitors within the industry 
(Site A/Site B were merged into one). A new name was given and for the purpose of this 
thesis is named Site C. There was a physical distance of approximately 100 miles 
between companies.  
In regards to stakeholders, it was noted the stakeholders included upper and 
middle management but not end-users. An executive committee was formed with power 
of authority. This committee, which comprised the stakeholders, met weekly. Funding 
was stable for this project. Requirements for I2 were not formally written or part of the 
front-end design of the implementation. 
The overall purpose to developing an Enterprise Joint System was to utilize the 
existing legacy system at Site A, one ERP system that included a Human Resource 
component, by modifying it to accommodate more end-users (3,000 to 6,000) from Site B 
which resulted in a Site C ERP system that included both Human Resources components 




















1. Both HR Systems are not 
interoperable. An operator needs 
to exit #1HR to enter #2 HR.
2. Site B HR System integrated with 
the legacy ERP system  
Figure 5. History of IT Integration 
The legacy ERP system at Site A included the #1 HR system. The legacy ERP 
system at Site B included the #2 HR system. The Site B #2 HR system was integrated 
inside the Site A legacy ERP system; thus, eliminating the Site B legacy ERP system. 
Although integration occurred, the Site A and Site B HR system were non-interoperable. 
An operator needs to exit Site A HR system in order to enter and operate in Site B HR 
system. The result is the third circle, New Site C, in Figure 5. The interviewee pointed 
out the transformation of this system of systems enabled the enterprise to have one ERP 
for seamless integration across the division. The business was managed the same way on 
both sides of the house; same metrics, same terminology, same processes, etc. This made 
the transformation easier from a business perspective.  
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On the technical side, this implementation was successful with integration 
because the HR System for Site B integrated seamlessly into the ERP system. However, 
the interoperability was not successful because once Site A and B HR System was 
embedded into the ERP system the two sites could not exchange information. The 
operator has to abort Site A in order to enter Site B. 
On the human side, the integration did not occur and interoperability was difficult 
between Site A and B. Since this was the merging of two companies, Site A end users 
knew their business processes but not the business processes of Site B. This was a 
challenge because Site A was in charge of developing and delivering training. For 
example, thirty subject matter experts from Site B were continuously interviewed to 
capture the entire picture of the legacy system. There was not any integration between 
functional areas or even within the functional area of Site B, which created a more 
complex challenge for Site A to create with a work breakdown structure. A job task 
analysis was not available to be used by Site A. Therefore, the fact that end-users would 
have different positions that possibly required new knowledge, skills and abilities was not 
acknowledged in the front-end to provide a workflow to support training of end-users. 
The mitigation plan developed was to have Site A subject matter experts work at Site B 
for months post go live to assist for up to 12 months.  
In retrospect, it seemed to the stakeholders that I2 would naturally occur in a 
successful manner both on the technical and human aspect. It needs to be realized that a 
system might work but the day-to-day business will not necessarily work. Often at the 
tactical level, it seems the end user understands the realities and importance of I2 
integration more than other stakeholders. Therefore, in the concept design phase end-user 
representation is critical to I2.  
C. SUMMARY 
Within the DoD and industry, there are thousands of system of systems programs 
that have requirements to be I2 with other legacy systems or other programs. The 
programs described in this chapter are a small sample that highlights the system 
engineering struggle with the I2 of a system of systems capabilities. 
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Other research suggests that programs are dysfunctional because of software 
issues only. Although this thesis addresses a system of systems viewpoint, it is important 
to pause and review, based on the samples provided in Chapters III and IV, the common 
challenges of I2 relating to software. Independent analysis of more than 280 federal, state, 
DoD, and commercial software-intensive programs were evaluated for characteristics 
related to direct or indirect common failures observed in system acquisitions that had 
difficulty with delivering products on time and on budget (Evans, Abela, & Beltz, 2002). 
The seven common characteristics are listed below and how these same characteristics 
could be related to I2 failures: 
• Failure to apply essential project management practices. Many project 
managers did not utilize project scheduling, configuration management, 
and proactive risk management. From an I2 perspective, this could reflect 
negatively toward having sufficient time and base-lining of interfaces to 
ensure the project meets the I2 requirements. 
• Unwarranted optimism and unrealistic management expectations. Some 
managers view components of a project through rose-colored glasses, 
remain in denial, and assume problems will be naturally resolved. Rarely 
does one find the integration of systems occurs naturally. Unless 
expectations are set upfront regarding the challenges of the I2 to other 
systems, it is also unrealistic that more than one system will perform 
seamlessly with other systems. 
• Failure to implement effective software processes. It seems programs fail 
to follow development processes for a number of reasons. Regardless of 
the facts that cause this adhoc approach, this leads to a high reliance on 
staff expertise. The factors that go into I2 can be very process oriented if 
the project follows such an approach. The top-down design of the 
operations, activities, functions, interfaces, protocols, data, etc. can lead to 
I2 each and every time if followed.   
• Premature victory declarations. Given that schedule is a key component to 
a successful program, premature declarations of completion should not 
happen. Success should not be declared until all the products are 
completed and tested because often quality and reliability suffer at the 
expense of meeting a deadline. For example, the Joint Interoperability Test 
Command (JITC) is responsible to test all programs that utilize standard 
interfaces to specific global nets or systems. Many times programs that 
successfully perform JITC Testing of standards compliance believe they 
are ready for fielding yet these same programs can/do fail to be I2 once 
fielded. Therefore, it takes more than standards to be I2. 
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• Lack of program management leadership. There are two types of 
leadership problems: managers with engineering and no management 
experience, and managers with management and no engineering 
experience. Without a blend of technical and managerial competency, I2 
from a system of systems perspective will mostly be lacking. 
• Untimely decision-making. Some managers avoid making time-critical 
decisions until it is too late. Unless the critical interfaces that support the I2 
are defined and base-lined early in the concept design phase, the risk of 
non-integration; therefore, non-interoperability risk is high. 
• Lack of proactive risk management. Many projects do not effectively 
utilize risk management. The distinguishing of the best programs with the 
best managers is how well they contain their failures. The I2 of a system of 
systems capability is considered by many a significant effort. The 
“failures” identified during development and testing of a program should 
be looked at as the “successes” to resolve I2 issues before the program is 
fielded. The I2 of a program and the resolution of non-integrated and non-
interoperability should be a high priority focus once identified by the 
project manager.  
In Chapters III and IV, a review of the program I2 findings examined the 
successful and unsuccessful I2 of system of systems. In the next chapter, a descriptive, 
normative (notional) and prescriptive model comprising a system of systems framework 
is proposed to provide categorization of attributes to introduce a best practice approach to 
applying I2 to system of systems. 
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V. SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS INTEGRATION AND 
INTEROPERABILITY FRAMEWORK 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In review of the system of systems highlighted in this thesis, according to Gholz, 
2002, metrics available to compare system integration capabilities are limited. Therefore, 
program managers have difficulty assessing the technical and human capabilities needed 
for successful I2. One set of metrics that evaluates the software engineering and system 
engineering level is the Capabilities Maturity Models developed by Carnegie Mellon 
University’s Software Engineering Institute (SEI), a research Federally Funded Research 
and Development Center (FFRDC) (http://www.sei.cmu.edu/). These models are based 
upon an enterprise’s dedication to following procedures to manage complex projects 
while maintaining control of documentation and interfaces at the component/subsystem 
level. For a program manager, these models may not be appropriate for assessing the I2 of 
system of systems nor providing a proactive design approach for I2 during the concept 
design phase of the product development lifecycle. A version of Table 3 presented early 
in Chapter III is now revised and presented to visualize how the programs from this thesis 
fit into this framework of system of systems at the High-Tech and Super High-Tech 
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Component/Subsystem A2 B2 C2 D2
1
Assembly
A1 B1 C1 D1
A B C D
Low-Tech Medium-Tech High-Tech Super High-Tech
Technological uncertainty/novelty  
Table 3.   A Simple Typology of Technological Systems with Nine System of Systems 
Thus far, explanation has been given for the various system scopes, levels of 
technology, concepts of importance, interfaces, and boundaries in relation to the success 
of I2 that has occurred. In addition, through review of system of systems in Chapters III 
and IV, results of key attributes were identified that result in an I2 system.  
B. SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS I2 FRAMEWORK 
In this framework, the attributes of system of systems I2 through descriptive, 
normative (notional) and prescriptive models will provide categorization to introduce a 
best practice approach to applying I2 to system of systems. The three models, descriptive, 
normative and prescriptive, form a system of systems framework that as proposed by the 
authors can provide a categorization of attributes to introduce a best practice approach to 
applying I2 to system of systems. The framework, provided in Table 4, is an extension of 
the work developed by Valerdi, Ross, & Rhodes, 2007.  
For the purpose of this thesis, a descriptive model represents the actual behavior 
and the reality of a system of systems program utilizing I2. The descriptive model 
describes a situation but does not give direction on what to do. The normative model 
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represents the standards and is a comparative measurement against the descriptive model 
providing a methodology for a gap analysis. Depending on the nature of the system of 
systems program analyzed, the normative models applied may be generic in nature or 
may require customization. This information formulates the prescriptive model, which 
provides specific recommendations to achieve the ideals referred to by the normative 
(notional) model. It indicates what might be accomplished in a given situation (Maier & 
Rechtin, 2000). The descriptive, normative and prescriptive attributes for these models 









































Information from Comparison Provides Prescriptive Model
Prescriptive Model for Joint System
System of Systems I2 Framework
"Name of System of Systems"
Descriptive Model
Compare Descriptive Model Against Normative Model
 
Table 4.   System of Systems I2 Framework 
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1. Standardized Attributes for Models 
Standardized attributes were assigned to each row within the descriptive and 
normative models of the framework. These choices were selected by the authors based on 
the findings from research in Chapters III and IV. These attributes were utilized to 
synthesize both the descriptive model, Table 5, and the normative (notional) model, 
Table 6. This created a standardized comparison approach to formulate the gap analysis. 
For clarification, the terminology pertaining to the models is provided below: 
As defined by Merriam-Webster, an Enterprise is a business organization 
(http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/enterprise). For example, a large 
corporation or government agency is an enterprise. 
As extracted from the Defense Acquisition Guidebook (2006), a 
System of Systems is a set or arrangement of interdependent systems that 
are related or connected to provide a given capability. The loss of any part 
of the system will significantly degrade the performance or capabilities of 
the whole. The development of a system of systems solution will involve a 
trade space between the systems as well as an individual system’s 
performance. For example, the USCG Deepwater program is a system of 
systems.  
A Family of Systems is a grouping of systems having some common 
characteristic(s). For example, each system in a family of systems may 
belong to a domain or a product line (e.g., a family of missiles or aircraft). 
A family of systems lacks the synergy of a system of systems. The family 
of systems does not acquire qualitatively new properties as a result of the 
grouping. In fact, the member systems may not be connected into a whole 
(https://akss.dau.mil/DAG/Guidebook/IG_c4.2.6.asp). For example, the 
Future Combat System is a family of systems.  
A standalone system is one that can operate independently without external 
support from a functional perspective. For example, a microwave oven qualifies as a 
standalone system. 
Integration: the program addresses integration to make whole or complete by 
adding or bringing together parts; unify. 
Interoperability: the ability of a system or component to function effectively with 




Purpose/Capabilities Well defined, not defined, not addressed, changing, no immediate need
Scope of I2 Enterprise design, SoS, FoS, standalone
Stakeholders Involved, too Involved, provided stategy, part of decision making at all levels, etc
Funding Shoe string, well funded, not funded, no stable funding, rolling funding (funds as project progresses)
Schedule Adequate, rushed, used artifical deadlines, no schedule slip allowed
Technical
Requirements
Cutting edge, bleeding edge, unknown, COTS based, 
partially defined, adequately defined
Human System Integration
Well trained, not well trained, no HSI interface, adequate 
HSI interface, adequate documentation, unknown 
documentation, considered critical to the design, 
Criticality of Interfaces Well defined, not fixed, outside of program control
Seamless Operation Required, Not Required  
Table 5.   Definitions and Standardized Attributes for Descriptive Table 
2. Normative Model (Notional) 
The Normative Model was developed as a notional model by reviewing all the 
positive attributes defined in the standardized descriptive model. The standard phrases 
were derived from the various programs researched in this thesis. 
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Integration Interoperability


























Considered critical to 
design
Criticality of
Interfaces Well Defined Well Defined
Seamless Operation Required Required
Normative Model (Notional)
 
Table 6.   Standardized Attributes for Normative Notional Model 
C. GAP ANALYSIS USING SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS FRAMEWORK FOR I2 
1. Unmanned Air Vehicles Analysis 
a. Unmanned Air Vehicles Descriptive and Normative Model 
The outlined cells in bold in the Descriptive Model reflect the area where 




Purpose/Capabilities Well Defined Changing
Scope of I2 Standalone Family of Systems
Stakeholders Involved Too little Involvement





Cutting Edge Partially Defined
Human System
Integration Well Trained Unknown
Criticality of
Interfaces Well Defined Outside Program Control
Seamless Operation Required Initially Not RequiredNow Required
Integration Interoperability
Purpose/Capabilities Well Defined Well Defined
Scope of I2 Enterprise Design, SoS, FoS, Standalone Enterprise Design, SoS, FoS
Stakeholders
Involved
Part of Decision Making
Provided Strategy
Involved







Requirements Adequately Defined Adequately Defined
Human System
Integration Considered Critical to Design Considered Critical to Design
Criticality of
Interfaces Well Defined Well Defined
Seamless Operation Required Required
Normative Model (Notional)
System of Systems I2 Framework
Unmanned Air Vehicles
Descriptive Model
Compare Descriptive Model Against Normative Model
 
Table 7.   Unmanned Air Vehicles Description and Normative Model 
b. Unmanned Air Vehicles Prescriptive Model 
The cells with text reflect the initiation of a prescription for this program 
to support interoperability. Further study is required to develop a full prescription. The 




Joint Tactics, Training, and 




Involve Operational Reps, Joint 
Forces Command, and Coalition 
Partners
Funding Required 
Schedule Needs to be Established
Technical
Requirements








Critcial in Concept Design Phase 
with Trade-offs
Seamless Operation Testing in an Operational Environment
Prescriptive Model forUnmanned Air Vehicles
 
Table 8.   Unmanned Air Vehicles Prescriptive Model 
2. Future Combat System Analysis 
a. Future Combat System Descriptive and Normative Model 
Table 9 displays the FCS Descriptive and Normative Model. Upon review, 




Scope of I2 Enterprise Design Enterprise Design
Stakeholders Involved, Part of decision making
Involved, Part of 
decision making




Cutting Edge, COTS 
Based, 




Considered critcal to 
the design
Considered critcal to 
the design
Criticality of
Interfaces Well Defined Well Defined
Seamless Operation Required Required
Integration Interoperability


























Considered critical to 
design
Criticality of
Interfaces Well Defined Well Defined
Seamless Operation Required Required
Normative Model (Notional)
System of Systems I2 Framework
Future Combat System
Descriptive Model
Compare Descriptive Model Against Normative Model
 
Table 9.   Future Combat System Descriptive and Normative Model 
3. Enterprise Joint System Analysis 
a. Enterprise Joint System Descriptive and Normative Model 
The outlined cells in bold in the Descriptive Model reflect the area that a 




Purpose/Capabilities Well-defined Not addressedNo immediate need




Funding Stable Funding None
Schedule Adequate None
Technical
Requirements Well-defined Not defined
Human System
Integration Not defined Not defined
Criticality of
Interfaces Well-defined Not defined
Seamless Operation Required Not required
Integration Interoperability


























Considered critical to 
design
Criticality of
Interfaces Well Defined Well Defined
Seamless Operation Required Required
Normative Model (Notional)
System of Systems I2 Framework
Enterprise Joint System
Descriptive Model
Compare Descriptive Model Against Normative Model
 
Table 10.   Enterprise Joint System Descriptive and Normative Model 
b. Enterprise Joint System Prescriptive Model 
The cells with text reflect the initiation of a prescription for this program 
to support interoperability and augment integration. Further study is required to develop a 




Purpose/Capabilities Provide vision to anticipate need
Scope of I2









Critical in Concept 
Design Phase




Critical in Concept 
Design Phase
Seamless Operation
Prescriptive Model for Joint System
 
Table 11.   Enterprise Joint System Prescriptive Model 
D. SUMMARY 
Based on the gap analysis, it is critical and vital to initiate I2 investigation prior to 
the concept design phase of the product development lifecycle in order to produce 
systems that are interoperable and that ensure integration. 
The authors contend that conducting a systems integration process, through an I2 
Analysis, provides assurance to the customer that all system elements will function as a 
whole. Systems integration extends to the holistic notion that involves all of the 
organizational components of an enterprise during the entire cycle of the acquisition 
process and needs to begin during stakeholder analysis. 
1. I2 Analysis 
According to Langford, Franck, Huynh & Lewis, 2007, the purpose of the 
Stakeholder Analysis is to provide a process of a systematic method of identifying the 
stakeholders and their needs, value and interests. This initial brainstorming and 
discussion period among stakeholders is a critical point to initiate dialogue and gather 
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data points to ensure I2 capabilities such as complexity of the system of systems, required 
critical functions, and potential risks. This sets the stage for the design and development 
of the I2 Analysis, which needs to be continued throughout the product development 
lifecycle (Blanchard & Fabrycky, 2006). 
The I2 Analysis needs to be a continuous thread across the product development 
lifecycle. Figure 6 is an adaptation from (Blanchard & Fabrycky, Figure 12.2, 2006) 
which overlays an I2 Analysis structure to introduce the concept of recognizing I2 
Analysis as a standard systems engineering approach that needs to be addressed through 
all the considerations such as requirements, architecture, risk analysis, cost estimation, 

























I2 Portion of 
Design Set, 




Figure 6. I2 Analysis Stages. 
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As shown by the I2 references in Figure 6, which augments the original 
(Blanchard & Fabrycky, Figure 12.2, 2006), the authors of this thesis introduce I2 
Analysis as a new procedure or technique recommended in the system engineering 
framework to support interoperability and ensure integration of system of systems. The 
key is to initiate the analysis at the stakeholder analysis phase to receive input that is 
incorporated into the needs assessment and continued throughout the product 
development lifecycle through various stages such as:  
• Preliminary I2 Analysis, I2 Portion of Design Set, Virtual T&E (modeling 
and simulation), I2 Physical T&E, and Deploy Operational T&E. 
• Further research and development needs to be conducted to develop this 
concept and the stages of I2. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
A. KEY RESEARCH FINDINGS 
This chapter answers the research questions posed by the authors in Chapter I. 
The lessons learned section in this chapter will expound upon the four key attributes 
related successful I2 systems below. 
1. Common and known Operational Environment 
2. Governance of the I2 boundaries 
3. I2 based acquisition, not schedule or funding 
4. Early Establishment of I2 requirements 
In Chapter V, I2 was introduced as a new procedure; below are some granular 
level techniques and procedures that also are recommended: 
• Improve capability architecting 
• Utilize modeling and simulation 
• Perform operational assessments during development test 
B. LESSONS LEARNED 
1. How do the Current Policies and Processes of Successful Large 
System of Systems Designs Support I2? 
Based on the research in this thesis, there are over eighty-eight statutory laws, 
regulatory laws, and various DoD instructions that address the requirement/need to 
develop systems that are I2. Chapter II has outlined many of these policies and processes.  
No doubt, the current policies and processes assisted in defining the system 
designs to attempt I2 but as outlined in Chapter IV, prematurely declare victory. It is 
insufficient to claim that all I2 capabilities have been met because the design passes the 
open standards test and evaluation. The policies related to I2 are meaningless unless the 
leadership (i.e., Program Manager, Chief System Engineering) strictly enforce these 
policies and procedures. These I2 policies and processes that are not clearly defined allow 
for misinterpretation and misuse. Specifically, missing from policies and processes is the 
quantitative definition of what constitutes an integrated and interoperable system.  
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The successful large systems described in Chapter IV seemed to address I2 up 
front and early in the system design. These programs addressed not only well defined 
requirements in most cases but also extensive testing during development to ensure I2 
capabilities. For example, with the FCS, the program established an entire Brigade in 
Arizona for full-time large scale operational testing to ensure I2 capabilities.  
For other programs that deal with I2 as just another requirement, without clearly 
defined policies and processes related to I2, and with limited compliance checking or any 
checks-and-balances, this issue of systems being fielded that are not I2 will most certainly 
continue. A program needs to ensure that prioritization and program funding is aligned to 
address I2 as part of the acquisition process. In addition, from this research it is worth 
noting that successful programs have shown responsibility and governance across the 
entire system of systems or enterprise and I2 is central to achieving the fielded 
capabilities.  
2. How Effective are the Existing Laws and DoD Instructions in 
ensuring Integration and Interoperability? 
Based on the various systems investigated in this thesis, successful I2 depends on 
the system design practices and ultimately the program office or service to allocate 
schedule and funding for the activity in the concept design phase, which includes 
capability analysis and functional decomposition. The existing laws and instructions 
assume programs allocate sufficient resources for this level of system engineering. 
As described in Chapter II, findings from GAO and others point to priority issues 
for an acquisition team that are created by DoD and Congress to ensure funding is spent, 
milestones are achieved, and the following year’s increment of funding is not lost. The 
real focus of these laws has not been on I2 of systems. Consequently, these laws state the 
needs to be I2 but never attempt to describe and quantify this characteristic. Based on a 
historical perspective, most of the I2 laws and follow-on instructions were written to 
address past program failures; however, but until the debate is finished regarding 
quantified terms for I2, history is sure to repeat.  
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These laws and instructions are only as effective as the oversight, planning, and 
execution of the system engineering principles – which begin with good system 
requirements. Currently, our research shows there is limited schedule and funding to truly 
follow these laws and instructions. Only in conjunction with a system’s Initial 
Operational Capability is there funding and schedule identified to patch the I2 challenges 
once a system is fielded.      
3. What are the Key Attributes that Result in an I2 System? 
Integration and interoperability within the context of this thesis has been primarily 
focused on vehicles (i.e., Space Shuttle), weapons (i.e., FCS), and sensors (i.e., UAV). 
How these systems are integrated and their degree of interoperability has been 
summarized in the Descriptive Framework in Chapter V. Reviewing the programs 
described in this thesis, there are a few common themes that support I2 development of 
systems.  
Observations common across many of the programs include the following. 
a. Common and Known Operational Environment 
For system capabilities that are developed by multiple program offices, 
there needs to be a common operational environment (i.e., ground combat, humanitarian 
support) to be defined and coordination among the systems.  
The Combat ID or UAV programs described in Chapters III and IV are 
examples of DoD programs in which all services have systems either fielded or being 
developed with minimal coordination beyond standard interfaces. The Joint operational 
environment for Combat ID or UAVs would be the starting point for a systems 
engineering decomposition to system activities and further allocation to system functions 
would continue through to the critical I2 points necessary for these multiple systems. 
These operational environments need to be agreed upon by all services 
and tested during an individual system’s developments and during any number of the 
Joint integration exercises that are conducted yearly. It requires the program managers 
and system engineers to plan, coordinate, and prepare for these events.  
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b. Governance of the I2 Boundaries 
An I2 boundary is the external interface between one system and another 
system. This external interface can be architected as a peer-to-peer, system of systems, or 
net-centric topology. An I2 defined boundary is more than just protocols or addressing. 
An I2 boundary includes specific data structures, common data units, timeliness, and 
quality of data as well as standard data and transmission protocols. 
The capabilities developed within tightly integrated systems with seamless 
integration must be deliberately engineered. The timeliness, quantity, and quality of the 
information that is critical and relevant to the overall capability can be difficult to define.  
Programs like FCS and the Space Shuttle are system of systems that are 
also well integrated and interoperable. These programs have structured systems 
engineering processes in place that include configuration management within and across 
the various systems and subsystems. These successful programs also feature governance 
over the I2 boundaries.  
The I2 across federated systems that are not within a single acquisition 
authority structure spreads Program Manager Title 10 authority across multiple systems. 
The United States Code (USC) Title 10 gives the Armed Forces various discrete statutory 
authorities. Various public laws defined in Chapter II have added detail or scope to this 
section of USC. A Program Manager with Title 10 authority has overall responsibility for 
all aspects of the program and no other individual can change, direct, or modify the 
Program Manager’s decision. Provided programs work together initially and develop 
those critical I2 interfaces there is not a single external authority capable of ensuring that 
the I2 boundary configuration remains constant. 
From a system of systems or Net-Centric perspective, such programs have 
explicit or imexplicit I2 requirements. Persistent system engineering analyses across these 
individual programs can refine and establish the necessary requirement to ensure an I2 
capability. The limited authority to require program managers to adjust and correct I2 
issues is met with significant resistance and Title 10 authority that seems to supersede the 
DoD or Congress’s mandate for of I2. 
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c. I2 Based Acquisition, Not Schedule or Funding 
A common theme across programs that have been unsuccessful to attain I2 
completely is the lack of schedule or funding necessary to develop I2 solutions.  
Programs like Deepwater may have had adequate funding but based on 
contracted deliverables had tight schedule with little room for error. As many GAO 
reports referenced in this thesis have pointed out, program managers are focused on 
schedules and securing funding or keeping funding. 
Many well-developed I2 systems in operations today did not initially 
deploy as such. Most of these systems traded off I2 and performance to met schedule or 
cost realities.  
A recommended follow-on thesis could be the establishment of a 
framework for performance and I2 based acquisition.  
d. Early Establishment of I2 Requirements 
As part of the programs reviewed in this thesis, the systems that had well-
implemented I2 had either I2 requirements developed early in the design or as a part of a 
spiral acquisition strategy, with scheduled and funded demonstrations and user 
evaluations and demonstrations. 
An example of this is the FCS program. From a capability definition, the 
FCS actively exchanges data between systems and across the family of systems design. 
Early in design, the FCS program had specific requirements to be interoperable via a net-
centric, tightly integrated architecture. These requirements were further decomposed 
which resulted in a Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) as the framework of FCS.  
To ensure I2 requirements and the proposed implementation are correct, 
FCS has scheduled and funded I2 into the program operational assessments with not only 
Army operators but also joint tests with other ground combat units to include the Marine 
Corps. The result of these tests identified various problems in the implementation of 
some requirements and FCS corrected these issues as part of their open development 
testing events. 
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4. What New Recommendations Can Support Interoperability and 
Ensure Integration of System of Systems? 
The overall complexity of the systems design and type of architecture selected to 
achieve the required capability has a relationship to the amount of system engineering 
necessary to support interoperability and ensure integration. 
The following are some recommendation: 
a. Improve Capability Architecting 
Capability based acquisition depends upon fielding I2 systems to the 
operators that delivers the required capability. An example of this is the Army’s 
Improvised Explosive Device (IED) jammer. The development and fielding of the 
Army’s IED jammer was successful in blocking IED detonation signals. However, initial 
deployment of these units also jammed all platform communications. A jammer was 
fielded but the capability to jam IED signals while performing warfighting missions was 
not. 
Similar to system integration, capability integration is needed. As new 
requirements for new capabilities are established, the integration of these new 
requirements into the large warfighting functions need to be analyzed to identify I2 risk 
areas. 
Requirements that are decomposed from capability documents (i.e. JCIDS 
CCD and CPD) should include potential I2 issues with other capabilities either already 
fielded or currently in design in order to alert the program office and there engineering 
staff. 
b. Modeling and Simulation 
Modeling and Simulation (M&S) has been used for many programs to 
address mechanical issues, evaluate physical problems of a design, investigate critical 
timing issues, etc. Depending on the program, M&S was necessary to reduce risk or 
evaluate designs before production. 
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M&S on I2-focused events is not prevalent in the literature. This type of 
M&S is more about the development of the Interface Control Documents of a program 
via M&S evaluation. This upfront systems engineering could ensure I2 early in the 
lifecycle of a program. 
c. Operational Assessments during Development Test 
It will be many years, if ever, before completely-accurate I2 requirements 
are established for new acquisition programs. This is not a trivial endeavor. Requirements 
vetted through any of the current acquisition processes still are not adequate to ensure the 
design is I2.  
Operational assessments during the requirements allocation phase could be 
the point in which the end users get engaged in the design process. These early 
operational assessments would be a crucial review of the I2aspect of the systems. A 
similar review may also be conducted when any I2 requirements need to be established 
with other systems and capabilities that are already in use. 
Operational assessments during the early design phases should be 
conducted with simulators or real systems with which the new system is to be I2. These 
types of assessments in the form of lab tests should be conducted multiple times during 
the development and should be critical during Independent Verification and Validation 
IV&V testing. 
C. FUTURE RESEARCH  
The following are potential topics for future research in developing techniques for 
more integrated and interoperable system of systems: 
• Develop quantitative metrics corresponding to each cell of the Normative 
Model. These would logically have stakeholder weightings as input. 
• Investigate more examples from other industries (e.g., medical) with the 
quantitative metrics mentioned above applied to solidify the findings of 
this study. 
• Investigate how one would address the "devil-in-the-detail" details that are 
the ultimate problems with getting system of systems to be integrated and 
interoperable since this thesis addresses these issues at a very high-level. 
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APPENDIX A.  STATUTORY LAWS 
A. PUBLIC LAW 104-106-FEB. 10, 1996 
1. According to Public Law 104-106-Feb. 10, 1996: 
INTEGRATION 
DIVISION A-DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONS 
TITLE 1-PROCUREMENT 
Subtitle B-Program Requirements, Restrictions, and Limitations 
 SEC. 225. ADVANCED FIELD ARTILLERY SYSTEM (CRUSADER). 
(a) AUTHORITY TO USE FUNDS FOR ALTERNATIVE PROPELLANT 
TECHNOLOGIES. – During fiscal year 1996, the Secretary of the Army may use funds 
appropriate for the liquid propellant portion of the Advanced Field Artillery System 
(Crusader) program for fiscal year 1996 for alternative propellant technologies and 
integration of those technologies into the design of the Crusader. 
…(6) Development, for integration into the next prototype of the cannon, of 
engineering designs to control pressure oscillations in the chamber of the cannon during 
firing… 
Summary: Integration of present cannon system characteristics to control specific 
operability issues, i.e., chamber pressure oscillations. 
Subtitle C-Ballistic Missile Defense Act of 1995 
SEC. 234. THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE ARCHITECTURE. 
…(c) INTEROPERABILITY AND SUPPORT OF CORE SYSTEMS. - To 
maximize effectiveness and flexibility of the systems compromising the core theater 
missile defense program, the Secretary of Defense shall ensure that systems are 
integrated and complementary and are fully capable of exploiting external sensor and 
battle management support from systems such as – 
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(A) the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) system of the Navy; 
(B) airborne sensors; and 
(C) space-based sensors (including, in particular, the Space and Missile Tracking 
System.)… 
Summary: Core missile systems must be fully interoperability with other DoD 
systems. 
Subtitle E – Miscellaneous Reviews, Studies, and Reports 
SEC. 261. PRECISION-GUIDED MUNITIONS. 
(a) ANALYSIS REQUIRED. – The Secretary of Defense shall perform an 
analysis of the full range of precision-guided munitions in production and in research, 
development, test, and evaluation in order to determine the following: 
(1) The numbers and types of precision-guided munitions that are needed to 
provide complementary capabilities against each target class. 
(2) The feasibility of carrying out joint development and procurement of 
additional types of munitions by more than one of the Armed Forces. 
(3) The feasibility of integrating a particular precision-guided munition on 
multiple service platforms… 
Summary: Precision guided munitions must be interoperable with multiple 
platforms. 
INTEROPERABILITY 
SEC. 262. REVIEW OF C4I BY NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL. 
…(b) MATTERS TO BE ASSESSED IN REVIEW. – The review shall address 
the following: 
(1) The match between the capabilities provided by current service and defense-
wide C4I programs and the actual needs of users of these programs. 
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(2) The interoperability of service and defense-wide C4I systems that are planned 
to be operational in the future. 
(3) The need for an overall defense-wide architecture for C4I. 
(4) Proposed strategies for ensuring that future C4I acquisitions are compatible 
and interoperable with an overall architecture… 
Summary: Gap analysis to ensure C4I needs are met for all DoD systems. 
TITLE LIII – INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION PILOT 
PROGRAMS 
 Subtitle A – Conduct of Pilot Programs 
SEC. 5312. SOLUTIONS-BASED CONTRACTING PILOT PROGRAM. 
…(C) PROCESS REQUIREMENTS. – The Administrator shall require use of a 
process with the following aspects for acquisitions under the pilot program:… 
 …(d) PILOT PROGRAM DESIGN… 
 …(3) COMPLEXITY OF PROJECTS… 
…(B) In order for an acquisition project to satisfy the requirement in 
subparagraph (A), the solution for attainment of the executive agency’s objectives under 
the project should not be obvious, but rather shall involve a need for some innovative 
development and systems integration… 
Summary: Role and necessity of systems integration in information technology 
acquisition programs. 
B. PUBLIC LAW 105-261-OCT. 17, 1998 
1. According to Public Law 105-261-Oct. 17, 1998: 
INTEGRATION 
DIVISION A – DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONS 
TITLE XV – MATTERS RELATING TO ARMS CONTROL, EXPORT 
CONTROLS, AND COUNTERPROLIFERATION 
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Subtitle B – Satellite Export Controls 
SEC. 1514. NATIONAL SECURITY CONTROLS ON SATELLITE EXPORT 
LICENSING. 
(B) CONTENTS OF MONITORING. – The monitoring under subparagraph (A) 
shall cover, but not be limited to- 
…(ii) satellite processing and launch activities, including launch preparation, 
satellite transportation, integration of the satellite with the launch vehicle, testing and 
checkout prior to launch, satellite launch, and return of equipment to the United States:.. 
Summary: System integration specifics must be export controlled in addition to 
system design and operational details. 
INTEROPERABILITY 
TITLE III – OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE 
 Subtitle D – Information Technology Issues 
 SEC. 331. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
RESPONSIBILITIES OF CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICERS. 
…(2) ensure the interoperability of information technology and national security 
systems throughout the Department of Defense;… 
Summary: Interoperability is essential among different computer based systems in 
the DoD. 
SEC. 335. CONTINUITY OF ESSENTIAL OPERATIONS AT RISK OF 
FAILURE BECAUSE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND NATIONAL 
SECURITY SYSTEMS THAT ARE NOT YEAR 2000 COMPLIANT. 
…(b) CONTENT. The report shall contain, at a minimum, the following:... 
…(7) A discussion of the vulnerability of allied armed forces to the failure of 




together with an assessment of the potential problems for interoperability among the 
Armed Forces of the United States and allied armed forces because of the potential for 
failure of such systems… 
Summary: The impact of Y2K compliance on the interoperability of military 
systems. 
 Subtitle E – Defense Infrastructure Support Improvement 
SEC. 344. OVERSIGHT OF DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF 
AUTOMATED IDENTIFICATION TECHNOLOGY. 
…(3) As part of its oversight responsibilities, the Automated Identification 
Technology Office shall establish standards designed – 
(A) to ensure the compatibility and interoperability of automated identification 
technology programs in the Department of Defense; and … 
Summary: Interoperability is essential for DoD automated identification 
technologies. 
TITLE IX – DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ORGANIZATION AND 
MANAGEMENT 
 Subtitle C – Joint Warfighting Experimentation 
SEC. 922. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING JOINT WARFIGHTING 
EXPERIMENTATION. 
 …(b) Resources and Authority of Commander… 
…(5) Providing the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff with recommendations, based on the conduct of joint warfighting experimentation, 
for – 
improving interoperability; 
reducing unnecessary redundancy; 
synchronizing technology fielding; 
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developing joint operational concepts; 
prioritizing the most promising joint capabilities for future experimentation; and 
prioritizing joint requirements and acquisition programs… 
Summary: Recommendations for interoperability improvements in joint 
warfighting capabilities. 
TITLE XII – MATTERS RELATING TO OTHER NATIONS 
 Subtitle C – Matters Relating to NATO and Europe 
SEC. 1222. REPORT ON MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF AN EXPANDED  
 NATO ALLIANCE. 
…(1) An assessment of the tactical, operational, and strategic military 
requirements, including interoperability, reinforcement, and force modernization issues, 
as well as strategic and territorial issues, that are raised by the inclusion of Poland, the 
Czech Republic, and Hungary in the NATO alliance… 
Summary: Interoperability issues concerning the expanded NATO alliance. 
C. PUBLIC LAW 107-314-DEC. 2, 2002 
1. According to Public Law 107-314-Dec. 2, 2002: 
INTEGRATION 
DIVISION A-DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONS 
TITLE X – GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Subtitle B – Naval Vessels and Shipyards 
 SEC. 1025. SHIP COMBAT SYSTEM INDUSTRIAL BASE. 
  (A) REVIEW. – The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a review 
of the effect of the contract award announced on April 29, 2002, for the lead design agent 
for the DD(X) ship program on the industrial base for ship combat system development, 
including the industrial base for each of the following: ship systems integration, radar, 
electronic warfare, and launch systems. 
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Summary: Review the impact of DD(X) contract award on ship systems 
integration.  
INTEGRATION AND INTEROPERABILITY 
Subtitle C – Strategic Matters  
SEC. 1032. ANNUAL REPORT ON WEAPONS TO DEFEAT HARDENED  
  AND DEEPLY BURIED TARGETS. 
(b) REPORT ELEMENTS. – The report for a fiscal year under subsection (a) 
shall – 
(1) include a discussion of the integration and interoperability of the activities 
referred to in that subsection that were undertaken during that fiscal year, including a 
discussion of the relevance of such activities to applicable recommendations by the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff… 
Summary: Integration and interoperability of “Bunker Buster” systems which is 
conventional bomb used to destroy deeply buried targets.  
TITLE XII – MATTERS RELATING TO OTHER NATIONS 
SEC. 1205. COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON  
  COORDINATION AND INTEGRATION OF ALL UNITED   
 STATES NONPROLIFERATION ACTIVITIES. 
 …(d) ANNUAL REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF PLAN… 
“(C) a discussion of cooperation, coordination, and integration during such year in 
the implementation of the plan among the various departments and agencies of the United 
States Government, as well as private entities that share objectives similar to the 
objectives of the plan; and… 
Summary: Reviews integration issues related to weapons nonproliferation 
activities of various DoD related organizations. 
INTEROPERABILITY 
TITLE XIII – OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE 
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Subtitle F – Information Technology  
SEC. 353. INSTALLATION AND CONNECTION POLICY AND   
  PROCEDURES REGARDING DEFENSE SWITCH    
 NETWORK.. 
…(b) ELEMENTS OF POLICY AND PROCEDURES.- The policy and 
procedures shall address at a minimum the following: 
(1) Clear interoperability and compatibility requirements for procuring, certifying, 
installing, and connecting telecom switches to the Defense Switch Network. 
(2) Current, complete, and enforceable testing, validation, and certification 
procedures needed to ensure the interoperability and compatibility requirements are 
satisfied… 
…(d) INVENTORY OF DEFENSE SWITCH NETWORK.- The Secretary of 
Defense shall prepare and maintain an inventory of all telecom switches that, as of the 
date on which the Secretary issues the policy and procedures- 
 (1) are installed or connected to the Defense Switch  Network; but 
 (2) have not been tested, validated, and certified by the Defense 
Information Systems Agency (Joint  Interoperability Test Center). 
(e) INTEROPERABILITY RISKS. – On an ongoing basis, the Secretary of 
Defense shall – 
(1) identify and assess the interoperability risks that are associated with the 
installation or connection of uncertified switches to the Defense Switch Network and the 
maintenance of such switches on the Defense Switch Network; and 
(2) develop and implement a plan to eliminate or mitigate such risks as 
identified… 
Summary: Interoperability issues, i.e., risks, etc. with connecting civilian 
telecommunication switches to the defense switch network. 
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TITLE VII – HEALTH CARE PROVISIONS 
 Subtitle C – Department of Defense-Department of Veterans Affairs 
Health Resources Sharing 
SEC. 724. INTEROPERABILITY OF DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS  
 AFFAIRS AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PHARMACY   DATA 
SYSTEMS. 
(a) INTEROPERABILITY. – The Secretary of Veterans Affairs and the Secretary 
of Defense shall seek to ensure that on or before October 1, 2004, the Department of 
Veterans Affairs pharmacy data system and the Department of Defense pharmacy data 
system (known as the “Pharmacy Data Transaction System”) are interoperable for both 
Department of Defense beneficiaries and Department of Veterans Affairs beneficiaries by 
achieving real-time interface, data exchange, and checking of prescription drug data of 
out-patients, and using national standards for the exchange of out-patient medication 
information… 
Summary: Mandate interoperability of DoD and Veterans Administration 
pharmaceutical information gathering for veterans receiving medication. 
Subtitle A – Acquisition Policy and Management 
TITLE VIII – ACQUISITION POLICY, ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT, 
AND  RELATED MATTERS 
SEC. 802. REPORT TO CONGRESS ON EVOLUTIONARY   
 ACQUISITION OF MAJOR DEFENSE ACQUISITION   
 PROGRAMS 
 …(b) CONTENT OF REPORT. – The report shall, at a minimum, address 
 the following matters:… 
  …(3) The manner in which the Secretary plans to ensure that each  
  increment of an evolutionary acquisition process is designed- 
   (A) to achieve interoperability within and among United  
   States forces and United States coalition partners; and… 
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Summary: Defense acquisition programs need to incorporate interoperability 
requirements. 
The statutory laws are to ensure Institutions, Commands, Program Managers, and 
individuals are held liable for their actions or lack of action related to the I2 systems. 
Congress enacted these laws but imposed minimal criminal penalties to ensure 
integration or interoperability while performing business related duties. This situation 
imposes a general duty on Program Managers or Commands but does not identify 
criminal sanctions against an individual who fails to meet the I2 requirements.  
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APPENDIX B.  REGULATORY LAWS 
A. JOINT PUBLICATION 1 
According to Joint Publication 1: 
The Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, May 14, 2007, is 
the capstone publication for all joint doctrine, presenting fundamental 
principles and overarching guidance for the employment of the Armed 
Forces of the United States. In essence, the purpose of this document is to 
enhance the operational effectiveness of US Forces. An analysis and 
synthesis of the Joint Publication 1 doctrine follows. (Preface, i). 
INTEGRATION 
As written in the executive summary,  
the National strategic direction is governed by the Constitution, federal 
law, USG policy regarding internationally-recognized law and the national 
interest. This direction leads to unified action which is a broad term 
referring to the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the 
activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military 
operations to achieve a unified effort. Xi 
At a high level, Chapter III describes  
one of the functions and responsibilities within the Department of Defense 
which is the Integration of the Armed Forces into an effective and efficient 
team operating within the air, land, maritime, and space domains and the 
information environment. III-2 
This Joint Publication also presents guidelines for interagency coordination  
to assure that all participating agencies under appropriate authority focus 
their efforts on national objectives, specifically the Armed Forces of the 
United States have unique capabilities to offer the interagency community. 
These include influence through established military-to-military domestic 
and international contacts, resources (i.e., logistics) not available to 
nonmilitary agencies, trained civil affairs personnel and their assets; 
responsiveness based on military training and readiness. Additional unique 
military capabilities include C2 resources supported by worldwide 
communications and ISR infrastructures, robust organizational and 
planning processes, training support for large numbers of individuals on a 
myriad skills, and air, land, and sea mobility support for intertheater or 
intratheater requirements. VII-4 
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INTEROPERABILITY 
As with the Integration section above, unified action also demands maximum 
interoperability to achieve national strategic direction.  
The forces, units, and systems of all Services must operate together 
effectively. This effectiveness is achieved in part through interoperability. 
This includes the development and use of joint doctrine, the development 
and use of joint operation plans; and the development and use of joint 
and/or interoperable communications and information systems. It also 
includes conducting joint training and exercises. Xii 
In chapter I, Foundations, the fundamentals highlight the Joint Force.  
Twenty years after the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense (DoD) 
Reorganization Act (Title 10, US Code [USC], Sections 151-155) directed 
actions to remove the institutional barriers to jointness, the Armed Forces 
of the United States is a joint team. All Service components contribute 
their distinct capabilities to the joint campaign; however, their 
interdependence is critical to overall joint effectiveness. Joint 
interdependence is the purposeful reliance by one Service on another 
Service’s capabilities to maximize complementary and reinforcing effects 
of both; the degree of interdependence varying with specific 
circumstances. Fundamentally, joint forces require high levels of 
interoperability and systems that are “born joint” (i.e., conceptualized and 
designed with joint architectures and acquisition strategies). This level of 
interoperability ensures that technical, doctrinal, and cultural barriers do 
not limit the ability of Joint Force Commanders to achieve objectives. The 
goal is to design joint force capabilities – lethal and nonlethal – to fight 
and win the Nation’s wars and effectively carry out all other missions 
assigned across the range of military operations. I-2 
In Chapter II,  
Doctrine Governing Unified Direction of Armed Forces, under the section 
Relationship Between Combatant Commanders, Military Secretaries, 
Service Chiefs, and Forces, highlights interoperability and dictates how 
unified action demands maximum interoperability. Similar to Chapter 1, 
the essence is that the forces, units, and systems of all Services must 
operate together effectively. This effectiveness is achieved in part through 
interoperability. This includes the development and use of joint doctrine, 
the development and use of joint operation plans; and the development 
and use of joint and/or interoperable communications and information 
systems. It also includes conducting joint training and exercises. It 
concludes with a materiel development and fielding process that provides 
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materiel that is fully compatible with and complementary to systems of all 
Services. A key to successful interoperability is to ensure that planning 
processes are joint from their inception. Those responsible for systems and 
programs intended for joint use will establish working groups that fully 
represent the services and functions that will be affected and 
interoperability must be considered in all joint program reviews. 
Combatant Commanders will ensure maximum interoperability and 
identify interoperability issues to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
who has overall responsibility for the joint interoperability program. II-7 
In addition, the tenet Organization for Joint Command and Control outlines that 
component and supporting commands’ organizations and capabilities must 
be integrated into a joint organization that enables effective and efficient 
joint C2. The C2 structure is centered on the Joint Force Commander’s 
mission and concept of operations; available forces and capabilities; and 
joint force staff composition, capabilities, location, and facilities. The 
Joint Force Commander should be guided in this effort by four principles 
one of which is interoperability. C2 capabilities within joint force 
headquarters, component commands, and other supporting commands 
must be interoperable to facilitate control of forces. The simplest and most 
streamlined chain of command can be thwarted by an absence of 
interoperability among the components’ forces and systems. This 
includes an emphasis on the use of joint doctrine development of ISR, 
communications systems, and logistic architectures; joint training and 
exercises. IV-19 
Chapter V, Doctrine for Joint Commands, provides guidance to establish unified 
and subordinate joint commands.  
In regards to interoperability, there are principles to establish a 
Communications System Directorate of a Joint Staff (J-6). The J-6 assists 
the Commander in all responsibilities for communications infrastructure, 
communications computer networking, communications electronics, 
information assurance, tactical communications, and interoperability. This 
includes development and integration of communications system 
architectures and plans that support the command’s operational and 
strategic requirements, as well as policy and guidance for implementation 
and integration of interoperable communications systems in execution of 
the mission. V-16 
B. JOINT PUBLICATION 6 
According to Joint Publications 6: 
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The Joint Communications System, March 20, 2006, contains approved 
doctrine for communications system support to joint and multinational 
operations and outlines the responsibilities of Services, agencies, and 
combatant commands with respect to ensuring effective communications 
system support to commanders. It addresses how the communications 
system, in general, is to be configured, deployed, and employed to support 
the commanders of joint forces in the conduct of joint operations. 
(Preface, i)  
An analysis and synthesis of the Joint Publication 6 doctrine follows. 
INTEGRATION 
From the Executive Summary, Commander’s Overview it states  
 
“Effective command and control (C2) is necessary for proper integration 
and employment of operational capabilities.” Vii 
 
The objective of the joint communications system is to assist the joint 
force commander (JFC) in command and control (C2) of military 
operations. The first element of C2 system is people — people who 
acquire information, make decisions, take action, communicate, and 
collaborate with one another to accomplish a common goal. The second 
element of the C2 system taken collectively are the facilities, equipment, 
communications, and procedures essential to a commander for planning, 
directing, and controlling operations of assigned forces pursuant to the 
missions assigned. Although families of hardware are often referred to as 
“systems,” the C2 system is more than simply equipment. High-quality 
equipment and advanced technology do not guarantee effective C2. 
Effective C2 starts with well-trained and qualified people and an effective 
guiding philosophy and procedures. Vii 
The power of superiority in the information environment mandates that the 
United States fight for it as a first priority even before hostilities begin. 
This requires DoD to develop doctrine, tactics, techniques, and 
procedures, organizational relationships, and technologies to win this 
fight. The quality of information depends upon the accuracy, timeliness, 
relevance, usability, and completeness of information from all sources. A 
priority responsibility of command is to ensure access to all relevant 
information sources within and among all DoD and non-DoD 
organizations, and in multinational operations with mission partners. The 
continuous sharing of information from a variety of sources facilitates 
enabling the fully networked joint force to achieve shared situational 
awareness. I-6 
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This segment from Chapter I also relates to the Joint Publication 1 segment of this 
thesis, regarding Joint Communications System Roles and Responsibilities. This 
portion states the 
Joint Staff J-6 provides advice and recommendations about 
communications system matters to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (CJCS). In accordance with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Instruction (CJCSI) 8010.01A, Joint Community Chief Information 
Officer, the J-6 also serves as the joint community Chief Information 
Officer (CIO). As chairman of the Military Communications-Electronics 
Board (MCEB), the Director, J-6 utilizes the MCEB to coordinate and 
resolve Global Information Grid issues among the Services and member 
agencies. With respect to joint force support, under CJCS authority and 
direction, and subject to the supervision and guidance of the Director, 
Joint Staff (DJS), the Director, J-6 normally has the responsibility to: 
Information Integration (ASD(NII)), ensure that life-cycle management of 
joint C2 systems has the capability to support the President, the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Joint Staff, Services, combatant 
commands, DoD agencies, and any other entity that may comprise a joint 
operation. I-12 
INTEROPERABILITY 
Commander United States Strategic Command has overall responsibility 
for global network operations (GNO) and defense in coordination with the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the other combatant 
commands. Because the GIG represents the entire communications system 
of Department of Defense, there remain many decisions regarding 
planning and design that fall under the purview of the Assistant Secretary 
of Defense (Networks and Information Integration (ASD [NII]), who is 
also designated DoD’s chief information officer (CIO). Many of those 
decisions involve the insertion of new technology as well as other 
architectural standards, which may impact the interoperability of the DoD 
as a whole. Ix 
The hierarchical organization of management impacts the interoperability 
but as well uniform configuration management of the GIG ensures 
interoperability and survivability of the DoD information infrastructure. In 
addition to the expected adherence to DoD policy, GIG configuration is 
controlled through compliance with the GIG architecture. GIG assets, to 
include those that are commercial off-the-shelf, are to be configured in 
accordance with approved capabilities documents and standards and 




architecture. DoD has created various forums to assist the Chief 
Information Officer, as well as the Chairman and Joint Chiefs of Staff, in 
compliance determination. 
The DoD CIO (ASD [NII]) is responsible for developing, maintaining, and 
enforcing compliance with the GIG architecture. Inherent in the Chief 
Information Officer’s architecture responsibility is to enforce 
interoperability, information assurance (IA) net-centric data sharing, use 
of enterprise services, and GIG program synchronization. II-14 
In Chapter III, the Joint Force Communications System Operations Planning and 
Management Structure outlines  
…the CCDR, through the J-6, provides communications system guidance 
and priorities to supporting commands and components. The J-6 is 
responsible to the Joint Force Commander for providing the 
communications system to support reliable, timely information flow in 
support of unified action. The J-6 assists the Joint Force Commander in all 
communications systems responsibilities. III-1 
Within Chapter III is also the communication planning and management section 
that details a methodology for communication system planning into five areas: mission 
analysis, information needs analysis, interoperability, compatibility, and supportability 
analysis, capability analysis, and allocation of communications system assets. 
(1) Mission Analysis. During mission analysis, communications system 
planners develop the communications system estimate and specified and 
implied tasks to be performed by operators and communications system 
personnel. The communications system estimate is the J-6’s assessment of 
course of actions that serve as the foundation of the commander’s 
estimate, mission statement, intent, commander’s critical information 
requirements (CCIRs), and concept of operations and support of it. Using 
foundational knowledge of the C2 organization and communications 
system capabilities, planners translate the concept of operations, concept 
of support, CCIRs, and environment into specified and implied tasks 
during each phase of operations. Tasks are developed for the deployment, 
implementation, operations, sustainment, modification and restoration of 
C2 systems and networks to achieve IS throughout operations and support. 
Network management tools and C2 systems facilitate planning as well as 
SA. 
(2) Information Needs Analysis. Communications system planners work 
closely with all functional communities to develop information exchange 
requirements (IER). IERs identify products to be transmitted and received, 
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as well as the throughput, quantity, and characteristics of those products. 
The communications system is tailored to meet the projected IERs. During 
military operations, planners conduct analysis to see if the mission, 
concept of the operation and support, CCIRs and C2 organization 
necessitate the increase or decrease of the IERs, or new exchange 
requirements. Adjustments are made to the IERs as appropriate. For a 
more detailed discussion of IERs, refer to CJCSI 6212.01C, 
Interoperability and Supportability of Information Technology and 
National Security Systems. 
(3) Interoperability, Compatibility, and Supportability Analysis. 
Planners identify interoperability, compatibility, and supportability 
requirements and assess them against documented capabilities. When the 
mission permits, key interoperability and compatibility solutions will be 
validated before mission execution. Any shortfalls or deficiencies are 
assessed for operational and mission impact. In cases where operational 
and mission impact are too severe, the communications system planners 
determine whether it is operationally and technically feasible to resolve 
the problem in theater; if not, they request assistance from higher HQ. 
(4) Capability Analysis. Based on mission analysis, information needs, 
interoperability, compatibility, and supportability analysis, 
communications system planners identify the C2 systems and networks 
that can support the OPLAN. Service component planners should be 
brought into capabilities analysis as soon as possible. Capabilities analysis 
is a daily assessment during all phases of the operation. In the joint 
environment, attention is given to the organic C2 systems and networking 
capability of deploying and in place units. Provisions must also be made 
for higher HQ connectivity to its subordinate HQ and component-to-
component connectivity. Normally, a Service component unit is assigned 
responsibility for communications system support at each HQ or other 
element, and a standard package of C2 systems and networks is provided. 
The standard packages are matched against operational needs. Listings of 
overages and shortages are produced for each location, major platform, 
and mission. Special attention is given to the time-phased force and 
deployment data (TPFDD) 
(5) Allocation of Communications System Assets. After the template is 
developed, joint force and Service and functional component planners 
must examine all available resources and plan a tailored communications 
system. III-15 
Interoperability is one of the many factors that must be considered in the 
communication plan and should be achieved primarily by a commonality 
of equipment, software, and systems. Planners must know the capabilities 
and limitations of the other component communications system resources 
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and must be able to integrate them into the joint communications system 
plan. The joint communications-electronics operating instructions (CEOI) 
and communications security must be coordinated with Service 
CEOI/signal operating instructions and communications security must also 
be coordinated .III-19 
C. CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEF OF STAFF INSTRUCTIONS 
The Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Instructions (CJCSI) provides policy and 
guidance that does not involve the employment of forces. The instruction is of indefinite 
duration and is applicable to external agencies or both the Joint Staff and external 
agencies. It remains in effect until superseded, rescinded, or otherwise canceled. CJCS 
Instructions, unlike joint publications, will not contain joint doctrine and/or joint tactics, 
techniques, and procedures (http://usmilitary.about.com/od/glossarytermsc/g/cjcsi.htm). 
The following instructions were selected for this thesis based on the I2 significance to the 
Armed Forces. 
1. CJCSI 3100.01A September 1, 1999, Directive Current as of 
September 12, 2003 
JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING SYSTEM 
This instruction provides joint policy and guidance on, and describes the 
responsibilities and functions of, the Joint Strategic Planning Systems 
(JSPS). The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) utilizes this 
flexible system with the intent to interact with other DoD systems by 
providing support through military advice to the DoD Planning, 
Programming, and Budgeting Systems (PPBS), and strategic guidance to 
the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) (Enclosure 
A, Introduction, 1., A-1,) The utilization of JSPS provides a structured 
integrative plan that formulates strategic and contingency plans which 
shape requirements and assessment of capabilities. The Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff provides this comprehensive strategic information 
regarding the Armed Forces to the President and Secretary of Defense. 
2. CJCSI 6212.01D March 8, 2006, Directive Current as of March 14, 
2007 
INTEROPERABILITY AND SUPPORTABILITY OF INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY AND NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEMS 
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This set of instructions establishes policies and procedures for developing, 
coordinating, reviewing, and approving Information Technology (IT) and 
National Security System (NSS) Interoperability and Supportability (I&S) 
needs across the Armed Forces. The intent is to ensure that DoD 
components 1) meet operational needs of US forces; 2) are interoperable 
with existing and proposed IT and NSS; 3) support the existing and 
planned global information grid; 4) interoperate with allies and coalition 
partners; 5) be net-ready; and 6) enable US forces to protect, detect, 
restore and respond to essential information systems security situations. P. 
3 of CJCSI 6212 
This instruction drove the establishment the Joint Interoperability Certification 
Test Command (JITC). Many within the acquisition community work with JITC to 
ensure standard interface requirements related to a program are verified via the conduct 
JITC standards testing prior to fielding. JITC follows the processes outlined in Chairman, 
Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 6212.01, Interoperability and Supportability of 
Information Technology and National Security Systems, to perform their joint 
interoperability test and certification mission related to approving IT and NSS 
interoperability. JITC also establishes procedures for performing interoperability test 
certification using a new “Net-Ready” approach, which is a central network that focuses 
on the contributions and consumption of information within an organization.  
As the GIG evolves toward a net-centric architecture, interoperability testing must 
also evolve. Increasingly, the requirement will be to test a system’s ability to successfully 
discover and employ the appropriate information resources within the context of the GIG. 
Of course, real-world capability development and testing are rarely simple, and the DoD 
has provided several mechanisms for identifying and seeking solutions to current or 
foreseen interoperability problems. DoD policy clearly states that all IT and NSS, 
regardless of Acquisition Category (ACAT), must be tested and certified for 
interoperability before fielding. 
D. DOD INSTRUCTION 4630.8, PROCEDURE FOR INTEROPERABILITY 
AND SUPPORTABILITY OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (IT) AND 
NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEMS (NSS) 
According to the DoD Instruction 4630.8, 2004, three implementations are to be 
set forth support IT and NSS: 1) an updated policy and responsibilities for 
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interoperability and supportability, 2) a capability-focused approach for IT and NSS  
ensuring life-cycle interoperability throughout the DoD, and 3) a Net-Ready Key 
Performance Parameter to assess net-ready attributes for technical and end-to-end 
operational effectiveness. 
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